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The fact that the South African Constitution1 incorporates elements of a federal system 
suggests that it provides for a measure of provincial self-rule.  Yet the ambit of this self-
rule remains uncertain, with commentators asking whether provinces are to exist only as 
‘a cog in the conveyor belt’, facilitating delivery on national government policy, or 
whether they have the potential to undertake their own initiatives.2   
The Constitution favours a co-operative approach to federalism over a divided or 
competitive approach.  As part of this, the national government and the provinces are 
given overlapping powers in a wide range of functional areas set out in Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution.  Unlike the German federal system, which prevents the Lander from 
legislating in a functional area of concurrent competency once it is regulated by federal 
legislation, the South African Constitution allows the provinces to legislate in these 
circumstances.3  Thus, the functional areas in Schedule 4 offer potential opportunities 
for provincial initiatives.   
The functional area of the environment is included in Schedule 4.  Relying on its 
concurrent competency to legislate in this functional area, Parliament passed the 
National Environmental Management Act4 in 1998.  Generally referred to as ‘NEMA’, 
the Act seeks to promote co-operative governance in the regulation of the environment.  
Among other things, it establishes a new regulatory system for activities that have the 
potential to cause adverse environmental impacts.5  These activities may not be 
undertaken without an environmental authorisation.  Section 24 of NEMA empowers the 
national Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (‘the Minister’) and the 
Executive Council member responsible for the environment in each province (‘the 
MEC’) to list the activities requiring authorisation and to identify the ‘competent 
authority’ tasked with issuing authorisations.6  None of the MECs have exercised this 
power yet.  However, it is apparent from recent draft regulations published under 
NEMA, that the Minister intends to identify provincial authorities as competent 
                                                 
1 Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
2 R Simeon and C Murray ‘Multi-Sphere Governance in South Africa: An interim assessment’ (2001) 31 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 65 at 75. 
3 Section 146 of the Constitution regulates the enforceability of national and provincial legislation in a 
Schedule 4 functional area.  
4 Act 107 of 1998. 
5 The new regulatory system is discussed in more detail in Part II of this dissertation.  It is intended that 
this regulatory system would replace the system of environmental authorisations that is currently provided 
for in terms of sections 21 and 22 of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989. 




authorities in relation to the activities identified by the Minister.7   
The Western Cape Province (‘the Province’) has expressed concerns about the 
regulatory system provided for in section 24 of NEMA and is in the process of drafting 
provincial legislation in order to address these concerns.8  An important objective of the 
proposed provincial legislation is the establishment of an integrated application and 
authorisation procedure for activities that currently require land use approval, heritage 
approval or environmental authorisation.9  Thus, the proposed provincial legislation 
would regulate many of the activities for which environmental authorisation is required 
under NEMA and, in this respect, it would give rise to duplication.  If the operation of 
the regulations made under section 24 of NEMA is not suspended in the Province, the 
Province would be placed in the onerous position of having to implement parallel 
regulatory systems that overlap in the area of environmental authorisations.  
This dissertation uses the example of NEMA and the proposed provincial legislation to 
explore several constitutional issues and is divided into a number of parts.  Part II 
describes the regulatory system provided for in section 24 of NEMA in more detail.  Part 
III discusses the implementation of section 24 of NEMA, with reference to section 85 
and section 125 of the Constitution.  The latter two sections determine which sphere of 
government is responsible for the implementation of national legislation that falls within 
the functional areas listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution.  A related question is 
whether the national Minister can allocate all the responsibility for implementation of 
section 24 of NEMA to the provinces.  This is what the draft regulations published by 
the Minister seeks to achieve.  Thus, part III of this dissertation considers the 
constitutionality of the arrangement set up by the Minister in terms of section 24 of 
NEMA.    
Part IV of this dissertation provides some background to the proposed provincial 
legislation and the duplication that would be caused by its simultaneous operation with 
section 24 of NEMA in the Province.  In light of the potential problem of duplication, 
                                                 
7 Two sets of draft regulations have been published for comment under section 24 of NEMA.  The second 
set of draft regulations, which superseded the first, is entitled ‘Proposed regulations under section 24(5) of 
the National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act No. 107 of 1998) as amended’ was published in 
General Notice 12 of 2005 in Government Gazette 27163 of 14 January 2005.  
8 One of the concerns about the regulatory system in NEMA is that it does not provide sufficient guidance 
on what constitutes sustainable development, in order to guide decision makers issuing environmental 
authorisations.  In addition, NEMA adopts an approach of seeking to list all the activities that may have a 
detrimental impact on the environment.  While this approach encourages certainty, it allows certain 
activities to slip through the cracks because their impacts were not foreseen.  A further concern is the lack 
of integration between environmental authorisations, land use authorisations and heritage approvals, 
which is at odds conceptually with the notion of the environment as one integrated whole.  See part IV of 
this dissertation for further discussion in this regard. 
9 In addition, the proposed provincial legislation would ensure that planning instruments such as municipal 
Integrated Development Plans and provincial Spatial Development Frameworks are developed in a 
manner that furthers the objectives of sustainable development.  The provincial legislation is discussed in 




part IV considers the application of section 146 of the Constitution, which provides a 
mechanism for resolving conflicts between national and provincial legislation in a 
Schedule 4 functional area.  In particular, it explores whether ‘conflict’ - when used in 
the context of section 146 - includes duplication between national and provincial 
legislation. 
The principles of co-operative government set out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution are 
essential in a system of co-operative federalism.  The requirements of consultation and 
co-operation must be brought to bear on the implementation of national legislation such 
as NEMA and the avoidance of duplicated regulatory systems.  The application of co-
operative governance principles in this context is discussed in part V.     
II. CURRENT REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
AUTHORISATIONS 
(1) Pre-constitutional system of environmental authorisations 
The Environment Conservation Act10 (‘the ECA’) is national legislation that 
commenced in 1989, before the transition to a constitutional democracy.11  It currently 
regulates activities that have the potential to impact detrimentally on the environment 
but it will shortly be replaced by the regulatory system provided for in NEMA.   
Section 21 of the ECA empowers the Minister to identify activities that may have a 
significant detrimental effect on the environment.  Section 22 prohibits any person from 
undertaking an identified activity without a written authorisation issued by ‘the Minister 
or by a competent authority or a local authority or an officer’.  Furthermore, section 22 
provides that the competent authority, local authority or officer shall be designated by 
the Minister by notice in the Government Gazette.   
The Minister exercised the power to identify activities under section 21 of the ECA only 
in 1997.12  In that same year, the Minister also designated the competent authority in 
each province, acting in terms of his powers under section 22 of the ECA.  The relevant 
portion of the notice designating the competent authority reads as follows: 
‘[I] hereby, in terms of section 22(1) of the Environment Conservation Act, 1989 … designate the 
competent authority, as defined in section 1 of the said Act … in each province as an authority 
which may issue a written authorisation to undertake or cause to undertake an [identified] 
activity.’13
                                                 
10 Act 73 of 1989. 
11 The ECA was assented to on 1 June 1989 and commenced on 9 June of the same year. 
12 The list is contained in regulations published in GN R1182 in Government Gazette 18261 of 5 
September 1997. 




The notice refers to the definition of ‘competent authority’ in section 1 of the ECA.  
That definition reads as follows: 
‘“competent authority” in so far as a provision of this Act is applied in or with reference to a 
particular province, means the competent authority to whom the administration of [the ECA] has 
under section 235(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) 
been assigned in that province.’   
Unfortunately, the assignments made under section 235(8) of the Interim Constitution14 
dealt with other sections of the ECA and did not provide for the assignment of section 
22.15  Consequently, the designation of the provinces by the Minister is incomplete, as it 
relies upon the provinces having been assigned the authority to administer section 22 of 
the ECA.  The Constitutional Court noted this oversight in the Kyalami Ridge case.16    
In practice, the MEC responsible for environmental matters in each province is regarded 
as a competent authority for the purposes of issuing authorisations under section 22 of 
the ECA.17  While this practice could be challenged, I am not aware of any reported 
cases in which this argument has been relied upon to set aside an authorisation issued by 
a provincial department.  For present purposes, the important point is that the provinces 
currently administer and implement section 22 of the ECA in all cases other than those 
where regulations made under the ECA require that the Minister must consider an 
application for authorisation.18   
(2) The promulgation of NEMA after the commencement of the Constitution 
In 1998, Parliament passed NEMA, which repeals sections 21 and 22 of the ECA with 
effect from a date to be published in the Government Gazette.19  NEMA stipulates that 
the date fixed for the repeal to take effect may not be prior to the date on which 
                                                 
14 Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
15 In this regard, see Proc. R29 in Government Gazette 16346 of 7 April 1995 and Proc. R43 in 
Government Gazette 17354 of 8 August 1996. 
16 Minister of Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and another 2001 (3) 
SA 1151 (CC) at para 77.  In the case, the oversight was not material, as the Minister exercised the power 
to issue an authorisation. 
17 See, for example, BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and 
Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at 130 where it is stated that it is common cause that the respondent is a 
competent authority within the meaning of section 22 of the ECA.  The court states the basis for this 
position as follows: ‘Schedule 4 of the Constitution … has determined the environment as a functional 
area in which national and provincial legislature have concurrent competence [sic].  The respondent is 
therefore the competent organ of state and custodian of the environment in the Gauteng province.’   
18 This is in terms of regulation 4(3) of the ‘Regulations regarding activities identified under section 21(1)’ 
published in GN R1183 in Government Gazette 8261 of 5 September 1997.  The instances in which the 
Minister must consider an application include where the activity for which authorisation is sought has 
direct implications for national environmental policy or international environmental commitments. 
19 Section 50(2) of NEMA repeals sections 21 and 22 of the ECA with effect from a date to be published 




regulations are made in terms of section 24 of NEMA.20  Accordingly, the system of 
environmental authorisations provided for in section 24 of NEMA will replace the 
equivalent provisions of the ECA once final regulations are published under NEMA. 
The primary purpose of NEMA is to give effect to the environmental right in section 24 
of the Constitution.21  It seems uncontroversial to assume that NEMA was adopted by 
Parliament in terms of its competency to legislate in the functional area of 
‘environment’.  Certainly, the discussion of specific provisions of NEMA that follows 
makes it clear that NEMA is concerned with the protection and management of the 
environment.  The national government shares its legislative competency in the 
functional area of the environment with the provinces, in terms of part A of Schedule 4 
to the Constitution.   
NEMA is national framework legislation that, among other things, seeks to promote ‘co-
operative environmental governance’.22  It invokes a range of general mechanisms to 
achieve this objective.  Firstly, section 2 of NEMA sets out a substantial list of 
environmental management principles that must be applied by organs of state when they 
implement NEMA and any other legislation providing for the protection or the 
management of the environment.  Furthermore, NEMA establishes institutions, such as 
the Committee for Environmental Co-ordination,23 which are intended to promote co-
operative governance and conflict resolution.  NEMA also requires specified 
departments in the national and provincial spheres of government to prepare 
environmental management plans and environmental implementation plans.24  This is 
intended to promote co-ordination of environmental functions.  So, for example, NEMA 
requires each provincial government to ensure that the municipalities situated in that 
province comply with the applicable environmental implementation and environmental 
management plans.25  Moreover, NEMA creates a general duty to take reasonable 
measures to prevent pollution or degradation of the environment or, in certain specified 
circumstances, to minimise and rectify environmental pollution or degradation.26  
NEMA also provides general mechanisms for enforcing compliance with its provisions 
and those of other environmental management Acts.27
                                                 
20 Section 50(2) of NEMA. 
21 The preamble to NEMA incorporates section 24 of the Constitution.   
22 See the preamble to NEMA. 
23 Section 7 of NEMA establishes the Committee and sets out its objects and functions. 
24 See section 16 of NEMA. 
25 Section 16(4). 
26 This duty is imposed by section 28(1) of NEMA.  The lesser duty to minimise and rectify (rather than 
prevent) pollution or degradation only arises where the pollution or degradation either cannot be prevented 
or is authorised by law. 




In the context of a general framework Act, Chapter 5 of NEMA is something of an 
anomaly.  It lays down a specific regulatory system for identified activities that require 
environmental authorisation and geographical areas in which specified activities require 
authorisation.  Section 24 is central to the regulatory system provided for in Chapter 5.  
The following subsections of section 24 have particular relevance: 
‘(1) In order to give effect to the general objectives of integrated environmental management laid 
down in this Chapter, the potential impact on the environment of listed activities must be 
considered, investigated, assessed and reported on to the competent authority charged by this Act 
with granting the relevant environmental authorisation. 
(2) The Minister, and every MEC with the concurrence of the Minister, may identify –  
(a) activities which may not commence without environmental authorisation from the competent 
authority;  
(b) geographical areas based on environmental attributes in which specified activities may not 
commence without environmental authorisation from the competent authority…. 
(5) The Minister, and every MEC with the concurrence of the Minister, may make regulations 
consistent with subsection (4) - 
(a) laying down the procedure to be followed in applying for, the issuing of and monitoring 
compliance with environmental authorisations…. 
 
(6) An MEC may make regulations in terms of subsection (5) only in respect of listed activities or 
areas in respect of which the MEC is the competent authority.’ 
The power to identify activities and geographical areas is discretionary – section 24(2) 
provides that the Minister and each MEC ‘may’ identify activities and areas.  It is 
surprising that Parliament regards the regulatory system contemplated by section 24 as 
optional.28  Furthermore, the fact that an MEC requires the concurrence of the Minister 
to exercise its powers under NEMA raises questions regarding the consistency of this 
provision with the constitutional framework for the implementation of national 
legislation.  This is discussed further in part III of this dissertation. 
Authorisations for identified activities and activities within identified areas are issued by 
a ‘competent authority’, which is defined as follows: 
‘“competent authority” in respect of a listed activity or specified activity, means the organ of 
state charged by [NEMA] with evaluating the environmental impact of that activity and, where 
appropriate, with granting or refusing an environmental authorisation in respect of that activity.’29  
(Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
28 However, it is arguable that the Minister and the MEC have a duty to implement section 24 of NEMA in 
order to give effect to the constitutional right to the protection of the environment contained in section 24 
of the Constitution   




This definition is misleading, as NEMA does not charge any organ of state with these 
duties, except in certain instances where it stipulates that the Minister must be identified 
as the competent authority.30  Instead, section 24 provides as follows: 
‘When listing activities in terms of section 24(2) the Minister, or the MEC with the concurrence of 
the Minister, must identify the competent authority responsible for granting environmental 
authorisations in respect of those activities.’31  (Emphasis added)  
The concurrence of the Minister is required before an MEC may identify a competent 
authority.  Again, this raises questions about the appropriateness of this approach in the 
overall constitutional framework.  These questions are discussed further in part III.   
The recent draft regulations published under NEMA by the Minister identify provincial 
authorities as competent authorities tasked with issuing environmental authorisations for 
activities listed in the regulations.32  Specifically, the regulations provide that: 
‘[t]he competent authority shall be the environmental authority in the province in which the activity 
is to be undertaken unless it is an application for an activity contemplated in section 24C(2) of the 
Act, in which case the competent authority shall be the Minister [of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism].’33  (Emphasis added.) 
The ‘environmental authority’ referred to above is not defined in the regulations or in 
NEMA.  It is a vague term and could refer either to the department responsible for 
environmental matters in each of the provinces or to the MEC.  What is clear is that the 
Minister has allocated responsibility for the implementation of section 24 to the 
provinces, within a framework of identified activities determined by the Minister.  
Furthermore, the draft regulations contain extensive directions about the way in which 
this responsibility must be exercised.34  Presumably, compliance with the regulations is 
to be achieved using provincial resources and institutions, in the absence of any contrary 
indications in NEMA or the regulations. 
III. ASSESSMENT OF SECTION 24 OF NEMA WITHIN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
As noted above, section 24 of NEMA empowers both the Minister and each MEC to 
identify activities that require environmental authorisation and geographical areas in 
which specified activities require authorisation.  Furthermore, section 24 empowers the 
                                                 
30 These are set out in section 24C(2) and include, by way of example, where an activity has implications 
for national environmental policy. 
31 See section 24C(1) of NEMA. 
32 See note 7 for publication details of the draft regulations. 
33 Regulation 7(7) of the second set of draft regulations (note 7). 
34 In particular, the draft regulations specify the form of applications for authorisation, the types of 
considerations that may or must be taken into account by the competent authority and the conditions upon 




Minister and each MEC to identify a competent authority that is responsible for issuing 
environmental authorisations.  While none of the MECs have exercised their powers 
under section 24, draft regulations published by the Minister35 identify a range of 
activities and designate the ‘environmental authority in each province’ as the competent 
authority.   
This raises several interesting questions.  The first is whether the allocation of 
responsibility to provinces by the Minister is consistent with section 125 of the 
Constitution, which addresses the implementation of national legislation by the 
provincial executives.  Section 125 must be read together with section 85 of the 
Constitution,36 as well as the specific provisions of section 24 of NEMA.  The latter 
section provides an indication of where Parliament intended to place the responsibility 
for the implementation of the regulatory system contained in Chapter 5.  A further issue 
is whether the identification of provinces by the Minister is consistent with the 
constitutional framework, which contemplates the allocation of powers and functions by 
means of delegation, agency and assignment.  This question requires consideration of 
what the concepts of delegation, agency and assignment mean, within the context of the 
Constitution, and whether the act of identification fits within one of these concepts.   
These questions concern the relationship between the national government and the 
provinces, which must be looked at within the framework of multi-sphere co-operative 
government that is established by the Constitution.   
(1) Constitutional allocation of responsibility for the implementation of NEMA  
(a) Broad conceptual background to the constitutional framework 
Before looking at the specific provisions of the Constitution, there are some preliminary 
observations to be made about the constitutional context and the broad choices that had 
to be made between different models of government.  The establishment of a 
constitutional democracy in South Africa was preceded by much debate about whether 
the new democratic government should be unitary or federal.37  This sounds deceptively 
simple.  In fact, as Watts notes, there is no single model of either system that is 
universally applicable.38  Rather, there is much variation in both federal and unitary 
systems regarding the ‘degree of decentralisation and the characteristics of the central 
                                                 
35 Regulation 7(7) (note 7). 
36 Section 85 allocates responsibility to the national executive for the implementation of national 
legislation. 
37 Those favouring a unitary, strongly centralised state were led by the African National Congress, which 
argued that the apartheid regime and its establishment of ‘independent’ Bantustans had discredited 
federalism.  Those political parties representing minorities or other groups seeking greater political 
autonomy advocated federalism.  The Inkatha Freedom Party exemplified this in relation to the Zulu 
people.  See Simeon and Murray (note 2) at 66. 
38 R Watts ‘Is the New Constitution Federal or Unitary?’ in B De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution 




institutions’.39  In general though, a ‘federal political system’ refers to a type of political 
arrangement that provides for a combination of shared rule and regional self-rule.40  The 
label ‘federal system’ can accommodate a range of more specific government structures, 
including a federation, which is the purest example of a federal system.41   
Although there is no closed list of federal systems, a clear distinction can be drawn 
between divided federalism and integrated federalism.  The divided federalism model 
sets up the central and regional governments as entirely separate, independent political 
institutions with clearly divided responsibilities that provide for minimal or no 
overlapping or concurrent powers and functions.42  Interactions between these 
institutions involve bargaining in a manner similar to that employed by independent 
countries negotiating with one another.43  The clearest manifestation of divided 
federalism is Canada.44  In contrast, the model of integrated federalism (on which the 
German system is based) is designed to integrate and bring together central and regional 
politics at all levels and confers wide areas of concurrent powers on the central and 
regional governments.45  This arrangement requires a high degree of consensus-building 
and co-operative behaviour to achieve co-ordination and avoid duplication of effort.46   
Possibly due to the political differences of opinion regarding whether South Africa 
should be constituted as a unitary or federal democracy, no reference to either term 
appears in the Interim Constitution or the final Constitution.  Watts assesses the Interim 
Constitution against the criteria of federal systems and federations and finds that it falls 
within the broad category of a ‘federal political system’ and that it displays some 
elements typical of a federation.47  However, he notes that other elements of the system 
are more consistent with a ‘regionalised unitary system’: these elements include the 
distribution of legislative and executive powers and financial resources between the 
national and provincial governments.48  For this reason, Watts concludes that the Interim 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Watts (note 38) at 76. 
41 A federation is one of the strongest or purest examples of a federal state.  It does not require the regional 
governments to be subordinated to the central government. In contrast, the constitutional relationship 
between central and regional governments in a unitary system involves a degree of subordination of 
regional governments to the national one.  See Watts (note 38) at 77. 
42 R Simeon ‘Considerations on the Design of Federations: The South African Constitution in 
Comparative Context’ (1998) 13 SA Public Law 42 at 51. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Simeon (note 42) at 54. 
45 Simeon (note 42) at 55. 
46 Ibid. 





Constitution creates a hybrid system that, while predominantly displaying the features of 
a federation, contains elements of a more centralised, unitary system.49   
The leaning towards federalism is echoed in the Constitutional Principles, which 
underpin the final Constitution.50  In particular, Principle XIX provides that national and 
provincial government shall have both exclusive and concurrent powers and Principle 
XXI states that decisions shall be taken at the level that is ‘most responsible and 
accountable’, thus incorporating the principle of subsidiarity.51  These two Principles, 
taken together with elements of the other Principles, are regarded by many as providing 
for a federal structure in the South African constitutional democracy.52  Indeed, the 
general consensus is that the final Constitution does contain many elements of the 
federal systems found in other jurisdictions and therefore it is regarded as creating a 
federal system but one that is highly centralised.53  In the First Certification judgment,54 
the Constitutional Court highlighted the fact that the Constitutional Assembly chose a 
system of co-operative government in terms of which important functional areas are 
allocated concurrently to the national and provincial levels of government.55  This is an 
important aspect of the Constitution that has a bearing on the manner in which the 
powers and functions of the national and provincial governments should be exercised. 
(b) The implementation of NEMA in the context of multi-sphere government 
Understanding the South African constitutional system in the context of the available 
choices is helpful but it is no substitute for an analysis of the system itself.  The 
Constitutional Court noted in the First Certification judgment that the provinces are not 
sovereign states:  they were established by the Interim Constitution and derive their 
powers from it.56  Similarly, the Constitutional Principles that provided a foundation for 
the drafting and certification of the final Constitution do not intend to create sovereign 
                                                 
49 Watts (note 38) at 86 and 88.  Watts revised his analysis of the Interim Constitution with reference to 
the amendments effected in 1994.  He concluded that the amendments made the Constitution more federal 
in nature; however, he reiterated the conclusions drawn in his analysis of the initial text to the effect that 
the national government retains strong powers including the ability to encroach upon areas of provincial 
competence, within certain limits.  Thus, it is aligned with strongly centralised federations elsewhere. 
50 These 34 Principles are referred to repeatedly in the First Certification judgement and the full text of the 
Principles is appended to the judgment.  See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (1) SA 744 (CC) at para 287. 
51 Simeon and Murray (note 2) at 67. 
52 Ibid.  And see K Hailbronner and C Kreuzer Implementing Federalism in the Final Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (1995) Konrad Adenauer Stiftung at 7, referred to by Simeon and Murray (note 
2) at 67. 
53 See Simeon (note 42) at 71 where it is stated that South Africa has a multi-level system of government 
that incorporates many elements of other federal constitutions.  See further, Simeon and Murray (note 2) at 
65. 
54 The First Certification judgment (note 50). 
55 The First Certification judgment (note 50) at para 287. 




and independent provinces.  Rather, they intend the final Constitution to create one 
sovereign state and they envisage that the provinces will have only those powers and 
functions allocated to them by the Constitution.57  Thus, the Constitution is the starting 
point when seeking to clarify the relationship between the national government and the 
provinces and the role of the provinces in the implementation of legislation.   
Chapter 1 of the Constitution begins with an affirmation of several important principles.  
First, it states that South Africa is one sovereign state,58 rather than a confederation of 
sovereign regions.  This hints at a centralised approach to federalism.  Second, Chapter 1 
confirms the application of the rule of law and the position of supremacy of the 
Constitution in the legal system.59  Further, perhaps self-evidently, it states that all 
obligations imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled.60  The emphasis on a unitary 
state in Chapter 1 is not absolute.61  It must be read in context with other constitutional 
provisions, which demonstrate that government power is not confined to national 
institutions.  In particular, section 40 records that government is ‘constituted as national, 
provincial and local spheres of government’ and that these spheres are ‘distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated’.62  Simeon notes that the terminology of ‘spheres’ is 
deliberately chosen, as it suggests that the South African government is a single regime 
acting through multiple institutions.63  In contrast, the more commonly used terms 
‘levels’ and ‘orders’ of government denote a divided or competitive sovereignty that is 
inconsistent with a co-operative approach to government.64  It follows that the conferral 
of powers on different spheres of government is coupled with an obligation to respect 
the requirements of co-operative government set out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution: all 
other constitutional provisions must be read and understood in light of those 
requirements.65  These requirements are discussed further in part V of this dissertation. 
In keeping with a co-operative approach to government, the Constitution allocates wide 
areas of concurrent or shared powers to the national and provincial spheres of 
                                                 
57 First Certification judgment (note 50) at para 259. 
58 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
59 Section 1(c) and 2 of the Constitution. 
60 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
61 That emphasis is evident mainly from references to a sovereign state.  Cameron AJ makes the point that 
this emphasis is not absolute, with reference to the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Constitution, in the 
Liquor Bill case.  (See Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re Constitutionality of the 
Liquor Bill 2000 (1) BCLR 1  at para 40. 
62 Section 40(1) of the Constitution. 
63 Simeon (note 42) at 45 (fn 11). 
64 Ibid.  Simeon does not actually suggest that the idea of divided sovereignty is inconsistent with the 
principle of co-operative government.  However, this conclusion is a corollary of his point that the 
reference to ‘spheres’ is more consistent with the constitutional principle of co-operative governance. 




government in addition to the exclusive powers of each sphere.66  There are two broad 
categories of powers conferred on the spheres of government: legislative power and 
executive power.   
Self-evidently, legislative power is the power to pass laws.  Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures share concurrent competence to make legislation in the functional 
areas listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution.67  Those functional areas include the 
environment.68  Parliament and the provincial legislatures also have concurrent 
legislative power to make legislation ‘with regard to a matter that is reasonably 
necessary for or incidental to the effective exercise of a power concerning any matter 
listed in Schedule 4’.69   
Furthermore, provincial legislatures have the power to make legislation in the functional 
areas listed in Schedule 5 of the Constitution.70  This power is virtually exclusive, 
subject to one proviso.  The Constitution permits Parliament to encroach on the 
exclusive provincial legislative competency in relation to Schedule 5 matters by passing 
legislation with regard to a functional area listed in that Schedule in prescribed 
circumstances.71  These circumstances include where the national legislation is 
necessary to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services or to 
maintain essential national standards.  This demonstrates the fact that the Constitution 
intends the national government to play the central role in setting standards that apply 
uniformly.  This was noted in the Premier, Western Cape case,72 which referred to the 
constitutional structure as being one that makes provision for framework legislative 
provisions to be set by the national sphere of government.73  The same intention is 
evident in section 146 of the Constitution.74
Provincial legislatures may pass legislation in relation to a matter outside of the 
functional areas listed in Schedules 4 and 5 only if the matter has been expressly 
assigned to the provinces by national legislation.75  In contrast, Parliament has plenary 
                                                 
66 Simeon (note 42) at 55 to 56. 
67 Section 44(1)(a)(ii) confers this power on Parliament and section 104(1)(b)(i) does the same for 
provinces. 
68 The functional area of ‘environment’ is listed in Part A of Schedule 4. 
69 Section 44(3) confers this legislative competency on Parliament.  Section 104(1)(b)(i) read with section 
104(4) confers these legislative competencies on provinces. 
70 Section 104(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution. 
71 Section 44(2) of the Constitution. 
72 Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 657 (CC). 
73 At para 50. 
74 For example, section 146(2)(b) provides for the national legislation to prevail over the provincial 
legislation where the national legislation deals with a matter that provides uniformity and provides that 
uniformity by establishing, among other things, norms and standards or frameworks.  Section 146 is 
discussed further in part IV of this dissertation. 




legislative powers and may make legislation in any functional areas not listed in 
Schedule 4 or Schedule 5.76   
The second category of constitutional powers is executive power, which encompasses 
activities such as the preparing and initiating of legislation, the development of policy, 
the co-ordination of government departments and the implementation of legislation and 
policy.77  In the national sphere of government, executive authority is vested in the 
President who exercises it collectively with the other Cabinet members.78  The ways in 
which executive authority may be exercised are set out in section 85 of the 
Constitution.79  One important way in which the national executive exercises its 
authority is by implementing all national legislation (including legislation pertaining to 
Schedule 4 functional areas) ‘except where the Constitution or an Act of Parliament 
provides otherwise’.80  The Constitution does provide otherwise – this is evident from 
section 125 of the Constitution, which regulates provincial executive authority.   
Provincial executive authority is vested in the Premier who exercises the authority with 
the other members of the Executive Council.81  The ways in which provincial executive 
authority may be exercised are set out in section 125 of the Constitution.82  In terms of 
section 125(2)(b), provincial executive powers include the implementation of all 
national legislation within the functional areas listed in Schedules 4 and 5 ‘except where 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament provides otherwise’.83  Therefore, section 
125(2)(b) limits the ambit of the executive authority conferred on the national executive 
in terms of section 85.  While section 85 confers a general authority on the national 
                                                 
76 This is evident from the reference to ‘any matter including ...’ in section 44(1)(a)(ii).   
77 In this regard, see President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 
(SARFU) 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 at para 139.  This is also evident from the types of activities listed in 
relation to national and provincial executive powers in sections 44 and 104 of the Constitution 
respectively. 
78 Section 85(1) and (2) of the Constitution.  Section 92(2) of the Constitution provides that members of 
the Cabinet are ‘accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers 
and the performance of their functions.’ 
79 The fact that it is a closed list is evident from section 85(2)(e), which provides for the performance of 
any other executive function provided for in the Constitution or national legislation.  In other words, there 
is no source of residual executive powers and functions other than the Constitution and national 
legislation. 
80 Section 85(2)(a) of the Constitution.  The reference to ‘national legislation’ in section 85(2)(a) is not 
qualified in any way.  In addition, there is no other reference to the implementation of national legislation 
in section 85.  Thus, it seems clear that the reference to ‘national legislation’ includes legislation made 
under the concurrent competency to legislate in Schedule 4 areas. 
81 Section 125(2) of the Constitution. 
82 Section 125(2) of the Constitution.  The fact that it is a closed list is evident from section 125(2)(g), 
which provides for the performance of any other executive function assigned to the provincial executive in 
the Constitution or national legislation.  Note that this is distinct from the powers conferred on the Premier 
in terms of section 127 of the Constitution. 




executive in relation to the implementation of all national legislation, section 125(2)(b) 
confers a more specific power on provincial executives in relation to a subset of national 
legislation – namely national legislation within Schedule 4 and 5 functional areas.     
Like section 85, section 125(2)(b) is subject to any qualification contained in the 
Constitution.  An express qualification is contained in section 125(3) of the Constitution, 
which provides that the provinces must have the administrative capacity to implement 
the national legislation in question.84  A further tacit qualification of the provincial 
power to implement national legislation is that the provinces must have the necessary 
financial resources.85  Because provinces have very limited powers to raise revenue,86 
they are reliant on their allocated share of revenue raised by the national government.  
Chapter 13 of the Constitution entitles provinces (and local government) to an equitable 
share of the revenue raised by the national government in order to facilitate the 
performance of allocated functions and the provision of basic services.87  Chapter 13 
also provides for the provinces (and local government) to receive further allocations 
from national government revenue on a conditional or unconditional basis although there 
is no entitlement to these allocations.88  The equitable division of national revenue and 
the distribution of further allocations are provided for annually in the Division of 
Revenue Bill, which specifies the share of national revenue allocated to each sphere of 
government.89  The Bill is passed in terms of section 76 of the Constitution.90  
Consequently, the provinces have the opportunity to deliberate on its provisions through 
their collective representation in the National Council of Provinces (‘NCOP’). 
                                                 
84 Section 125(3) of the Constitution.  A dispute about whether a province has the necessary administrative 
capacity must be referred to the National Council of Provinces (‘NCOP’) for resolution in terms of section 
125(4).  Furthermore, the national government is obliged to assist provinces in developing the 
administrative capacity for the effective exercise and performance of all their executive powers and 
functions in terms of section 125(3). 
85 Returning to the identification of provinces under section 24 of NEMA, discussed in part II of this 
dissertation, it seems unlikely that the provinces would be able to rely on either of these qualifications.  
This is due to the fact that the provinces are currently responsible for the implementation of section 22 of 
the ECA, which is soon to be replaced by section 24 of NEMA.  Both Acts provide for a regulatory system 
of environmental authorisations: presumably the administrative and financial resources required to 
implement NEMA are much the same as those currently employed in relation to the ECA. 
86 In terms of section 228(1) of the Constitution, provinces are prohibited from imposing taxes, levies or 
duties that fall into the category of income tax, value-added tax, general sales tax, customs duty or rates on 
property.  The entitlement to impose rates on property is reserved to local government in terms of section 
229(a), which is also permitted to levy surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of the 
municipality.  By implication, the entitlement to impose all other forms of rates, taxes and levies referred 
to in section 228(1) is reserved to the national government. 
87 Section 227(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
88 Section 227(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
89 Section 9 of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997 provides for the annual introduction 
of a Division of Revenue Bill in Parliament.  See also section 214(1)(b) of the Constitution. 




Furthermore, like section 85, section 125(2)(b) is subject to any qualification contained 
in an Act of Parliament.  Determining whether an Act of Parliament qualifies the 
position in terms of section 85 read with 125(2)(b) can only be determined on a case-by-
case basis, with reference to a specific Act.  In the present context, the relevant Act is 
NEMA.  As noted in part II of this dissertation, section 24 of NEMA puts in place a 
regulatory system in relation to activities that may impact detrimentally on the 
environment.  Pursuant to this, section 24 empowers both the Minister and the MEC to 
do the following: 
1. identify activities that require environmental authorisation and geographical areas 
in which specified activities require authorisation;91  
2. identify the competent authority responsible for granting environmental 
authorisations in respect of those activities;92 and   
3. make regulations that prescribe, among other things, the procedure applicable to 
applications for authorisation, the issuing of authorisations and the monitoring of 
compliance with the conditions of authorisations.93   
How does section 24 fit into the framework of section 125(2)(b) and, in particular, the 
meaning of the phrase ‘an Act of Parliament provides otherwise’?  It seems clear that 
section 24 of NEMA intends to empower both the national and provincial executives to 
implement its provisions.  Therefore, it provides an exception to the default position 
under section 85 of the Constitution read with section 125, in terms of which the 
provincial executives are given the authority to implement national legislation in the 
functional area of the environment, to the exclusion of the national executive.   
However, executive authority for the implementation of NEMA is not evenly distributed 
in terms of section 24, as the powers conferred on the MECs are limited.  In particular, 
each MEC may exercise the power to identify activities, areas and competent authorities 
only with the concurrence of the Minister.  There is a clear distinction between a 
requirement to consult with the Minister and a requirement to obtain the concurrence of 
the Minister.  The latter allows the Minister to control the manner in which each MEC 
exercises his or her powers.  It is debatable whether this form of control is consistent 
with the constitutional framework, which envisages the provincial executives exercising 
their powers in consultation with, rather than under the dictates of, the national 
executive.94   This is particularly so where the MEC is identifying an authority within 
the provincial sphere of government.  Moreover, it is not immediately apparent why 
                                                 
91 Section 24(2) of NEMA.  
92 See section 24C(1) of NEMA. 
93 Section 24(5) empowers the Minister, and every MEC, with the concurrence of the Minister, to make 
these regulations. 
94 While Chapter 3 of the Constitution exhorts organs of state in the national and provincial spheres of 
government to consult one another and co-ordinate their actions and legislation, it does not envisage the 




there is a need for this form of Ministerial control.  It may be intended to ensure that a 
high standard of environmental protection is maintained, so as to avoid a situation where 
industries wishing to undertake environmentally harmful activities engage in forum 
shopping between the various provinces.  But expanding on the identified activities in 
national regulations and providing for these to apply uniformly across all the provinces 
could achieve this outcome.  It seems likely that the powers conferred on each MEC are 
intended to assist with regulating activities that are specific to one region.  Such 
activities could include mining of a mineral that occurs only in one region.  Similarly, 
regional listing of geographical areas by an MEC allows each province to amplify the 
protection of sensitive areas within its region.  If this is the purpose of the regional 
listing, it is unclear why the Minister should have a veto power in relation to the 
activities and areas that are identified by a province.   
These limitations on the powers of MECs suggest that the national executive will take 
the leading role in determining how section 24 is implemented.  Two questions flow 
from this.  The first is whether the allocation of a leading role to the Minister is 
consistent with the constitutional framework for the implementation of national 
legislation.  Section 125(2)(b) does envisage that provincial executive authority may be 
limited by an Act of Parliament, such as NEMA.  Furthermore, the provinces do have 
some control over limitations of this nature as legislation within Schedules 4 and 5 must 
be passed in accordance with the procedure set out in section 76 of the Constitution. 95  
Through their collective representation in the NCOP, the provinces can propose 
amendments to the draft legislation or reject it.   In these circumstances, the National 
Assembly may only pass the draft ‘with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its 
members’.96  This provides a limited safeguard for provincial autonomy.  Therefore, it 
seems that the leading role given to the national executive in terms of section 24 is not 
inconsistent with the constitutional framework for the implementation of legislation.97  
Of course, the effectiveness of this process in safeguarding provincial autonomy 
depends on the ability of the NCOP to fulfil its role as representative of provincial 
interests.98   
The second question raised by section 24 is whether a leading role entitles the Minister 
to allocate all the responsibility for implementation to the provinces and issue directions 
as to how that responsibility should be fulfilled.  This is clearly what the Minister seeks 
                                                 
95 Section 76(3) provides for national legislation that falls within a functional area to be passed in terms of 
section 76(1).  Section 76(4) contains a similar provision in relation to national legislation that falls within 
a functional area in Schedule 5 and is made by the national government in terms of its powers under 
section 44(2 of the Constitution to encroach on this exclusive area of provincial legislative competency. 
96 Section 76(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
97 The Constitutional Court made out this argument, when certifying the Constitution.  In particular, the 
Court pointed out that although the executive authority conferred on the provinces by section 125(2)(b) 
could be limited by an Act of Parliament, that Act would require the assent of the NCOP.  See the First 
Certification judgment (note 50) at para 252. 
98 Steytler notes that the NCOP has not performed this role adequately.  See N Steytler ‘Concurrency and 




to achieve in terms of the regulations made under section 24.99  The allocation of 
responsibility in this way could have significant administrative and financial 
implications for the provinces.100  Therefore, the allocation must be contemplated in 
terms of NEMA.  If section 24 of NEMA makes it clear that the provinces bear full 
responsibility for the implementation of the regulatory system, the provinces would have 
had the opportunity (in theory)101 to raise any concerns about this through the NCOP, at 
the time when NEMA was tabled in Parliament as a section 76 Bill.  Furthermore, the 
provinces (through the NCOP) are given the opportunity to raise concerns about the 
financial resources necessary to implement section 24 when the Division of Revenue 
Bill is tabled.102  This provides a potential mechanism for provinces to obtain further 
funding for the year in which the regulations are due to be finalised and the years 
following thereafter.   
However, section 24 of NEMA does not contemplate that all the responsibility for 
implementation will be allocated to the provinces by the national government.  It 
empowers both the national and the provincial executives to implement its provisions.  
In certain circumstances, section 24 identifies the Minister as the competent authority;103 
and in all other circumstances, section 24 does not specify who the competent authority 
should be.  In light of this, it seems logical to assume that the Minister would identify 
national agencies to implement regulations made by the Minister and that the provinces 
would identify provincial agencies.  In discharging their obligations, both spheres would 
need to act in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and, in particular, the 
principles of co-operative government.  These principles impose a duty on the national 
executive and the provincial executives to consult one another and co-ordinate their 
actions in the implementation of section 24.104
Furthermore, the allocation of full responsibility to provinces by the Minister must be 
done in a manner that is consistent with the constitutional mechanisms for allocating 
responsibility.  The Constitution recognises three ways in which the national executive 
                                                 
99 As outlined in part II of this dissertation, the provinces are identified as the competent authorities, albeit 
in vague terms – the competent authority is defined in the regulations as the ‘environmental authority in 
the province in which the activity is to be undertaken’.  Furthermore, the competent authority is 
responsible for considering applications for authorisation and deciding whether to grant authorisation, in 
accordance with extensive directions issued by the Minister. 
100 The provinces currently are responsible for the implementation of the ECA.  However, to the extent 
that the new regulatory system imposes more onerous obligations on the provinces, fiscal considerations 
remain relevant. 
101 The ability of the provinces to raise concerns in relation to national legislation that is adopted in terms 
of section 76 of the Constitution is dependent on the effectiveness of the NCOP in representing provincial 
interests.  
102 The Division of Revenue Bill must be passed in accordance with section 76 of the Constitution.  This is 
apparent from section 76(4) read with section 77(1)(d) of the Constitution.   
103 Those circumstances are described in section 24C(2) of NEMA. 





may allocate responsibility for the implementation of executive powers and functions.  
These are delegation, agency and assignment.  Accordingly, it is necessary to consider 
what these terms mean in the constitutional context and whether the act of identification 
falls within one of these categories.   
(2) Delegation, agency arrangements and assignment under the Constitution  
(a) Delegation of executive authority  
In the public law context, delegation is understood to mean the transfer of powers 
conferred on a functionary in order to facilitate the exercise of those powers by the 
transferee.105  It is a very different concept to a delegation that takes place in the private 
law realm.106   
Prior to the adoption of the Interim Constitution and, subsequently, the final 
Constitution, authority for delegation was derived from the common law rule of 
delegatus delegare non potest, which holds that executive bodies may not delegate their 
powers unless the empowering legislation authorises them to do so.107  In terms of the 
standard form of delegation at common law, the delegating functionary (or delegans) 
retains responsibility for the power exercised and may at any time revoke the delegation 
or withdraw any decision taken under the delegated power.108  It is clear from this 
formulation that a functionary can only delegate a power that he or she holds.   
Delegation is provided for in section 238 of the Constitution: 
An executive organ of state in any sphere of government may –  
(a) delegate any power or function that is to be exercised or performed in terms of legislation to 
any other executive organ of state, provided that the delegation is consistent with the 
legislation in terms of which the power is exercised or the function is performed; or 
(b) exercise any power or perform any function for any other executive organ of state on an 
agency or delegation basis. 
                                                 
105 WA Joubert (ed) LAWSA vol 20, part 2 (2000) at para 179.  
106 The act of delegation in the private law context refers to the transfer of a debt or other obligation 
irrevocably to a new debtor, with the agreement of the original debtor, the new debtor and the creditor.  It 
brings about a novation of the debt: a new debtor is substituted for the original one and the debt between 
the original debtor and the creditor is extinguished.  See R H Christie The Law of Contract 4ed (2001) at 
536 and 537. 
107 IM Rautenbach and EFJ Malherbe Constitutional Law 4ed (2004) at 209. 
108 The standard form of delegation in the context of public administration is referred to as 




Section 238 does not define what is meant by a delegation under the Constitution.  In the 
Executive Council, Western Cape case,109 the Constitutional Court explained delegation 
as ‘a revocable transmission of subsidiary authority’.110  Although the Court was 
referring to delegation under section 144 of the Interim Constitution, there is no 
rationale for distinguishing it from delegation under the final Constitution.111  
Furthermore, in commenting on delegation under section 238 of the Constitution, Currie 
and De Waal note that it does not deprive the delegans of the power to perform the 
relevant function while the delegation is in force.112    
Subsection (a) of section 238 echoes the common-law rule of delegation by requiring the 
delegation to be consistent with the empowering legislation.  It is debatable whether this 
is met in circumstances where the empowering legislation neither prohibits nor 
authorises delegation.113  However, the consensus appears to be that the empowering 
legislation must authorise the delegation, either expressly or by implication.114  This 
accords with the common law approach and is echoed in the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, which provides that a delegation of power must be 
authorised by the empowering legislation.115  Overall, it appears that the constitutional 
version of a delegation is consistent with the common law meaning.   
Section 238 is a very wide empowering provision when it is read with the constitutional 
definition of an organ of state, which includes any functionary or institution exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of legislation, other than a court 
and a judicial officer.116  A relevant consideration is whether section 238 is framed 
widely enough to permit an executive organ of state to delegate a power or function to 
an executive organ of state in another sphere of government.  The exercise of a 
delegated power or the performance of a delegated function is likely to require 
administrative and financial resources.  Thus, if one sphere of government could shift 
obligations to another sphere of government by means of delegation, this could have 
significant fiscal implications.  Allowing the shifting of responsibility to take place 
between spheres in an ad hoc way seems to go against the order inherent in the 
constitutional framework, which contemplates an equitable allocation of revenue 
between the spheres that is done on an annual basis and with reference to the powers and 
                                                 
109 Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature and others v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and others 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC). 
110 At para 173.  See also the commentary on section 238 in I Currie & J De Waal The New Constitutional 
& Administrative Law vol 1 (2001) 247. 
111 Section 144(2) of the Interim Constitution provided that a province ‘shall have executive authority over 
… matters delegated to it by or under any law.’ 
112 Currie and De Waal (note 110) at 247. 
113 JR De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) 141. 
114 JR De Ville (note 113) at 141.  See also Rautenbach and Malherbe (note 107) at 210. 
115 Act 3 of 2000. Section 6(1)(a)(ii). 




functions allocated to each sphere of government by the Constitution and national 
legislation.117  An additional consideration is that the common law formulation of 
delegation does not contemplate a requirement for the consent of the functionary to 
whom a power or function is delegated and the Constitution does not make provision for 
the requirement of consent either.   
In addition to these concerns with delegation, it is important to consider the purpose of a 
delegation.  As noted by the Constitutional Court in the Executive Council, Western 
Cape case, delegation confers ‘a subsidiary authority’.118  Thus, the delegans may 
continue to exercise the power or perform the function that has been delegated.  
Furthermore, the delegans may revoke the delegation at any stage.  This seems to be 
used most appropriately in the context of a relationship between two parties where one is 
subordinated to the other.  The most obvious form of such relationship is an employment 
relationship.  In light of this, the concept of delegation does not lend itself readily to 
application in the relationship between the spheres of government.  In this regard, if a 
delegation can occur between different spheres of government, a municipal council 
could delegate a power or function to the national Cabinet.  Despite the language of 
spheres not levels set out in the Constitution, this form of delegation does not sit 
comfortably within the constitutional framework. 
Thus, it is necessary to impose some restrictions on delegation between different spheres 
of government.  One means of doing this is to take a strict interpretation of section 238 
and, in particular, the phrase that the delegation must be ‘consistent with the legislation 
in terms of which the power is exercised or the function is performed’.  The phrase could 
be interpreted to mean that the delegation of powers and functions between different 
spheres of government must be authorised expressly by the legislation.119  Moreover, a 
further restriction is imposed by the principles of co-operative governance.120  These 
apply to the actions of executive organs of state and therefore there is an inherent 
requirement for a delegans to consult with the organ of state to which a power or 
function is to be delegated, prior to effecting the delegation.  It is doubtful whether the 
obligation to consult in terms of co-operative governance principles equates to a 
requirement to obtain consent for a delegation.  However, there are other principles of 
co-operative governance that can be brought to bear on the situation in order to avoid a 
delegation that imposes an unacceptable burden on another sphere of government.  In 
particular, the principles require all organs of state to exercise their powers in a manner 
that ‘does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
government in another sphere…’.121  A decision to delegate a function or power to a 
sphere of government that does not have the capacity or resources to administer it would 
                                                 
117 In particular, see the reference to the Division of Revenue Bill in section 1(b) of this part III. 
118 Executive Council, Western Cape (note 109) para 173. 
119 This approach is suggested by several commentators.  See De Ville (note 113) at 141. 
120 Of course these principles apply equally to a delegation that takes place between executive organs 
within the same sphere of government. 




fall foul of this obligation.  Furthermore, a delegation of this nature would also fall foul 
of the obligation to support and assist other spheres of government.122
In summary, delegation in the public law context is a revocable act by which an organ of 
state transfers a power or function, vested in it by legislation, to another organ of state.  
The delegans retains ultimate responsibility for the exercise of the power or performance 
of the function and consequently, may intervene at any stage by revoking the delegation 
or amending the acts of the delegated authority.  The delegation must be authorised, 
expressly or by implication, in terms of the legislation under which the power or 
function is to be exercised.  The power to delegate is restricted further by the limitations 
imposed by the principles of co-operative governance, discussed above, which apply to 
all forms of delegation.   
Returning to section 24 of NEMA, discussed in part II of this dissertation, it appears that 
the identification of a competent authority by the Minister could constitute a delegation.  
For example, in circumstances where the Minister identified an organ of state within the 
national Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism as the competent authority, 
that organ of state would exercise the power under the control and supervision of the 
Minister.  However, the identification of the provinces as the competent authority does 
not fit comfortably into the concept of a delegation.  This is due to the fact that it 
involves the transfer of responsibility between different spheres of government.  
Furthermore, in terms of section 24 of NEMA read with the Constitution, the Minister is 
not intended to retain any residual responsibility for the functions performed by the 
provinces when the latter are acting as competent authorities, other than the oversight 
role ordinarily attributed to the national executive in relation to the obligations of every 
provincial executive.123  Similarly, the Minister is not in a position to withdraw an 
authorisation issued in terms of section 24 of NEMA, should he or she dispute the 
manner in which a province has exercised its discretion in granting that authorisation.   
(b) Agency arrangements in respect of executive authority 
Section 238(b) of the Constitution also authorises an organ of state in any sphere of 
government ‘to exercise any power or perform any function for any other executive 
organ of state on an agency … basis’.  In terms of the classical agency relationship, the 
agent fulfils a mandate on behalf of the principal and subject to directions issued by the 
principal or agreed to at the outset of the arrangement.   
A possible distinction between delegation and agency is that, in terms of the latter 
arrangement, the principal is precluded from acting while the agent is acting on behalf of 
the principal, unless the agreement between them provides otherwise.  Furthermore, 
because the agent acts on behalf of the principal, the resources allocated to the principal 
for the fulfilment of the power or function in question can be utilised by the agent in the 
performance of its mandate.  However, there are similarities between the two concepts.  
                                                 
122 This is imposed by section 41(f)(ii) of the Constitution. 




As with a delegation, there is a relationship of subordination between the agent and the 
principal.  In addition, the principal may withdraw the agency in circumstances where 
the agent does not fulfil the mandate adequately or at all.  For these reasons, an agency 
arrangement may be more appropriate between organs of state within the same sphere of 
government.124  Thus, the identification of provinces as competent authorities under 
section 24 of NEMA does not fit comfortably into the agency category, for much the 
same reasons as those applicable in relation to a delegation. 
(c) Assignment of executive authority 
Although the concept of assignment is referred to repeatedly in the Constitution, unlike 
delegation it is not a well-defined term in the public law context.  Is the concept of 
assignment distinct from delegation?  In a recent judgment, the Constitutional Court 
appeared to suggest that powers assigned to Cabinet ministers constituted a form of 
delegated authority.125  However, the Constitution does use the terms delegation and 
assignment in different contexts and therefore the concept of assignment must be 
explored further.  
It is helpful to begin by considering the ordinary meaning of assignment: 
[A]n act of making a legal transfer of a right or liability: an assignment of leasehold property. 
Allocate (a job or duty): Congress had assigned the task to the agency; 
Appoint (someone) to a job, task or organisation: she has been assigned to a new job.126
The first definition is more suited to the private law context.127  The other two 
definitions fit more easily into the context of public law because they contemplate the 
allocation of powers or functions rather than the conferral of rights or liabilities.   
These definitions provide a backdrop against which the constitutional references to 
assignment can be considered.  For present purposes, the focus is on assignment of 
powers and functions by executive organs of state within the national and provincial 
                                                 
124 In contrast, the relationship between the national and provincial spheres of government is one in which 
the Constitution is at pains to limit the circumstances in which the national sphere may intervene in the 
exercise of executive authority by the provinces.  Those circumstances are set out in section 100 of the 
Constitution. 
125 This was suggested in the matter of Minister of Home Affairs v Liebenberg 2002 (1) SA 33 (CC) at 
para 13 where the Court stated that ‘[t]he Constitution provide[s] in s 92(1) that ‘Ministers are responsible 
for the powers and functions of the executive assigned to them by the President’.  This highlights the fact 
that Ministers exercise no more than subordinate, delegated authority when they make regulations in terms 
of Acts of Parliament or perform other ministerial duties.’  The term ‘delegated authority’ may have been 
used fairly loosely in this context to refer to all ministerial duties when in fact the term is only really 
appropriate in the context of making regulations.   
126 C Soanes and A Stevenson The Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11ed (2004) at 95. 
127 In the private law context the act of assignment refers to the transfer of rights and obligations.  See 
Christie (note 106) at 537.  This does not translate readily into the public law realm, as private law rights 
are not equivalent to public law powers and statutory privileges.  Equally, private law liabilities are not 




spheres of government, as this is consistent with the facts at hand.  Local government is 
not considered in any detail; nor is assignment of legislative powers and functions.   
Broadly speaking, the Constitution contemplates two broad categories of assignment by 
and between executive structures.  The first is lateral or horizontal assignment, which 
takes place between the members of the same executive organ of state.  The second is 
vertical assignment, which takes place between members of executive structures in 
different spheres of government.   
In the broad category of lateral assignment, the term ‘assignment’ is used in three 
contexts.  The first context is the allocation of portfolios to the individual members of 
the national and provincial executives.  In the national sphere, the Constitution vests the 
executive authority of the Republic in the President who exercises it together with the 
other members of Cabinet.128  Section 92 of the Constitution provides that the President 
assigns executive powers and functions to the Cabinet members; it also stipulates that 
those members are responsible for the powers assigned to them.129  However, the 
Cabinet members are accountable to Parliament collectively as well as individually for 
the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.130  Similarly, the 
executive authority of a province is vested in the Premier who exercises it together with 
the other members of the Executive Council.131  Section 133 provides for the assignment 
of executive functions by each Premier to the members of his or her provincial 
Executive Council who are responsible for those assigned powers.132  Again, members 
of the Council are accountable collectively and individually to the provincial legislature 
for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.133   
The second context in which lateral assignment is used is the temporary re-allocation of 
powers and functions between members of the executive, to resolve a situation when one 
member is unable to perform his or her duties for some reason.  In these circumstances, 
the President (or the Premier) may assign to a member of the Cabinet (or a member of 
the Executive Council) the power or function of another member who is absent from 
office or unable to exercise the power or perform the function in question.134  The 
                                                 
128 Section 85(1) of the Constitution. 
129 The President is empowered to assign as a necessary corollary of the provision in section 92(1) to the 
effect that the Cabinet members are responsible for powers and functions assigned to them by the 
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130 In terms of section 92(2) of the Constitution. 
131 Section 125(1) of the Constitution. 
132 The Premier is empowered to assign as a necessary corollary of the provision in section 133(1) to the 
effect that the Executive Council members are responsible for the functions assigned to them by the 
Premier.  It is interesting to note that reference is made to executive functions in section 133; in contrast, 
section 92 refers to powers and functions in relation to Cabinet members.  Nothing turns on the distinction 
for the purposes of this dissertation. 
133 Section 133(2) of the Constitution provides for this. 




assignment is denoted as temporary by the use of the section heading ‘Temporary 
assignment of functions’.135   
The third context in which lateral assignment is used is to re-allocate or shuffle powers 
and functions between different members of the executive on a more permanent basis.  
In this regard, the Constitution empowers the President to transfer to a Cabinet member 
the administration of any legislation entrusted to another member or any power or 
function entrusted by legislation to another member.136  The Premier has similar powers 
of transfer.137  The term ‘transfer’ is used instead of ‘assignment’.  It is doubtful whether 
anything turns on this.   
The second broad category of assignment is vertical assignment.  This has very different 
implications to lateral assignment because it allows for executive powers and functions 
to be transferred between different spheres of government.  Section 99 of the 
Constitution empowers Cabinet members to assign any power or function to be 
exercised in terms of an Act of Parliament to a member of any provincial Executive 
Council.138  Similarly, a provincial Executive Council member may assign to a 
Municipal Council powers or functions to be exercised or performed in terms of an Act 
of Parliament or provincial Act.139  There is no provision for assignment to take place in 
the reverse order.  Thus, a Municipal Council may not assign a power or function to a 
provincial (or the national) executive and a member of an Executive Council may not 
assign a power or function to the national executive.   
The focus in this dissertation is on vertical assignments by a member of the national 
executive to a member of a provincial Executive Council in terms of section 99.  A 
vertical assignment must comply with two requirements: it must be made in terms of an 
agreement between the assignor and the assignee and ‘it must be consistent with the Act 
of Parliament in terms of which the relevant power or function is exercised or 
performed’.140  The Constitution does not elaborate further on either of these 
requirements.   
The requirement for agreement between the assignor and the assignee gives the assignee 
a level of autonomy that is not provided for in relation to delegation under the 
Constitution.  However, the entitlement to withhold consent must be understood against 
the backdrop of co-operative government.  Among other things, the principles of co-
operative governance require organs of state ‘to co-operate with one another in mutual 
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trust and good faith’.141  If there is no objective reason for withholding consent and the 
assignee is engaging in a form of power play, it may be necessary to introduce a 
mechanism that can break the deadlock.  In these circumstances, the entitlement to 
withhold consent to an assignment may not be absolute.  This is discussed further on.142   
Klaaren and Chaskalson suggest that the requirement of consistency can be interpreted 
in two ways.143  The first interpretation is that the relevant Act must expressly or tacitly 
authorise the assignment.  Alternatively, there is consistency where the Act does not 
expressly or tacitly prohibit the assignment.  The second interpretation is regarded as 
better aligned with a constitutional system of co-operative governance.144   
Because vertical assignment takes place between different spheres of government, it 
allows for the redistribution of powers and functions between the spheres to varying 
degrees.  This can have a dramatic effect on the way in which powers and functions are 
allocated between the spheres of government and, consequently, on the resources needed 
by the respective spheres of government.  Thus, further implicit requirements for a 
vertical assignment to a province are that the province has the necessary administrative 
capacity and the financial resources to exercise or perform the assigned power or 
function.145  The equitable division of national revenue is based on factors that include 
the need to ensure that provinces (and municipalities) are able to perform the functions 
allocated to them.146  Thus, the allocation or re-allocation of functions in terms of a 
vertical assignment may require a recalculation of the equitable share of national 
revenue that has been allocated to a province in terms of the applicable Division of 
Revenue Act.  Due to the potential impact of vertical assignments on the 
intergovernmental fiscal allocation, the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act seeks to 
regulate this form of assignment.147  It requires the assignor to notify the Financial and 
Fiscal Commission (‘FFC’) of the ‘financial and fiscal implications’ of the assignment 
on matters that include ‘the future division of revenue raised nationally between the 
spheres of government’ and ‘the fiscal power, fiscal capacity and efficiency’ of the 
                                                 
141 Section 41(h) of the Constitution. 
142 In part V of the dissertation, which discusses the application of co-operative governance in the context 
of implementing national legislation. 
143 J Klaaren & M Chaskalson ‘Executive Government’ in M Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (Rev 5, 1999) 3.4(b)(ii). 
144 Currie and De Waal (note 110) at 247 (fn 123). 
145 In terms of section 125(3), a province only has executive authority to the extent that it has 
administrative capacity to assume effective responsibility.  The provision for allocation of adequate 
financial resources is discussed below. 
146 Section 214(2)(d) of the Constitution read with section 10(5)(a) of the Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations Act 97 of 1997. 
147 Act 99 of 1997.  The Act applies to both forms of vertical assignment, in other words, vertical 
assignment between the national executive and a provincial executive and between the provincial 




assignee province.148 The FFC is required to make a recommendation on the assignment, 
after receipt of the notification.  The Act provides that assignments are of no force or 
effect unless the assignor has considered the advice or recommendations of the FFC.149   
These tacit requirements qualify the constitutional power of assignment provided for in 
section 99.  However, they do not appear to be inconsistent with the Constitution.  In 
particular, the principles of co-operative governance in Chapter 3 of the Constitution 
require all organs of state to exercise their powers in a manner that ‘does not encroach 
on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another 
sphere…’.150  Once the parties have received the information regarding the financial and 
fiscal implications of the assignment and the recommendations of the FFC, they are 
better placed to make a decision about whether a particular assignment will encroach on 
the integrity of an organ of state in another sphere of government.  
Is an assignment revocable?  Brand argues that it must be regarded as an irrevocable act, 
as there is no constitutional provision for its reversal.151  However, this is not always the 
case.  In the context of lateral assignments, the President may reverse an assignment of a 
power or function to a particular Cabinet member at any time by utilising the powers 
under section 97 of the Constitution.  As noted above, this section empowers the 
President to transfer to a Cabinet member the administration of any legislation entrusted 
to another member or any power or function entrusted by legislation to another member.  
In the case of a vertical assignment, the Constitution does not empower a member of a 
provincial Executive Council to assign a power or function to a Cabinet member.  
Therefore, it is not possible to reverse an assignment by using section 99 of the 
Constitution or any other constitutional provision.  However, there may be a mechanism 
for assignment in terms of other legislation that provides for a vertical assignment to be 
reversed.  For example, the Land Administration Act empowers the President to reassign 
the administration of a law that had previously been assigned to a Premier in terms of 
the Act.152  Thus, a vertical assignment is not irrevocable in all cases.   
Unlike the position with a delegation, there is no principle that allows the assignor to 
continue to exercise the power or function that has been assigned.  However, the 
national executive would retain some degree of responsibility for the function performed 
by the assignee due to its oversight role in relation to the executive obligations of every 
                                                 
148 Section 3(2A)(i) of the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act. 
149 Section 3(2A)(c) of the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act.  However, if the FFC does not make a 
recommendation within the period of 180 days specified in section 3(2A)(b), the organ of state may 
proceed with the assignment after consultation with the National Treasury, if the assignment takes into 
account the implications that were highlighted in the submissions to the FFC in terms of section 
3(2A)(a)(i) of the Act.  
150 Section 41(g) of the Constitution. 
151 D Brand ‘Development of Concurrent Legislation – A New South African Perspective’ (1999) Seminar 
Report: Subnational Constitutional Governance Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 37 at 39. 




provincial executive.153  This role entitles the national executive to step in and take over 
the exercise or fulfilment of an assigned power or function where the provincial 
executive is unable to do so. 
To conclude, assignment of executive authority in the public law context constitutes the 
allocation or re-allocation of powers and functions, including the obligation to 
administer legislation.  It may be temporary or permanent.  An assignment may be a 
lateral assignment, between different members of the executive structure in one sphere 
of government, or it may be a vertical assignment that takes place between executive 
structures in different spheres of government.  In terms of vertical assignment, a national 
executive organ of state may assign a power or function to an executive organ of state in 
the provincial sphere; however, the reverse does not apply.  For this reason, a vertical 
assignment is regarded as irrevocable or irreversible in general.  The only manner in 
which it can be reversed is in terms of national legislation.  Agreement between the 
assignor and the assignee is a requirement for a vertical assignment.  In the context of 
co-operative government, it is arguable that a provincial executive organ of state may 
not withhold its agreement without any reason.  Tacit requirements for a vertical 
assignment are that the provincial organ of state has the necessary administrative and 
financial capacity.  These requirements are intended to ensure that the assignment does 
not undermine the integrity or functioning of the province.  Linked to this, a vertical 
assignment is subject to consideration by the FFC, with reference to the impact it may 
have on the equitable distribution of national revenue to the province in question. 
Returning to the provisions of section 24 of NEMA, the identification of the provinces 
clearly involves a transfer of responsibility between different spheres of government.  
Furthermore, section 24 does not envisage that the Minister would retain the entitlement 
to exercise the powers and functions entrusted to the competent authority in terms of 
regulations.  While the retention of this power may be a tacit term in circumstances 
where the competent authority is located within the national sphere of government, the 
same term cannot be implied in the relationship between the Minister and the 
provinces.154  For these reasons, the identification of the provinces as a competent 
authority by the Minister seems to fit more comfortably into the category of assignment 
than that of delegation.  Therefore the identification of a competent authority must be 
consistent with section 99 of the Constitution.  Section 99 does not allow the Minister to 
assign powers or functions to anyone in a province other than the MEC.  Accordingly, 
section 99 does not allow the Minister to identify ‘the environmental authority in the 
province’ as the competent authority.   
Assuming that the Minister had identified the MECs, section 99 imposes two 
requirements for a valid assignment.  The first is that it must be consistent with the Act 
of Parliament in question.  This requirement is met by the fact that NEMA makes 
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specific reference to assignment in terms of section 99.155  The second is that the 
agreement of each MEC is required for the assignment.  As noted above, the principles 
of co-operative governance are relevant to the question of assignment and, in particular, 
the manner in which the requirement of agreement should be interpreted.  It may be that, 
in certain circumstances, the entitlement to withhold consent to an assignment is not 
absolute.  However, it is helpful to defer the discussion of co-operative governance 
principles until after part IV below, which clarifies the nature of the proposed provincial 
legislation and the potential problems of duplication associated with it.  Accordingly, the 
application of co-operative governance principles is discussed in part V.   
IV. DUPLICATION BETWEEN NEMA AND THE PROPOSED PROVINCIAL 
LAW 
As noted in part I, the Province has identified problems with the current approach to 
environmental regulation and is developing provincial legislation to address these 
problems.  It is likely that certain of the provisions in the proposed provincial legislation 
would overlap with the system of environmental authorisations provided for in section 
24 of NEMA and the regulations made under NEMA.  This would create a problem of 
duplication.  Section 146 deals with the conflict between national and provincial 
legislation that falls within the functional areas in Schedule 4 and 5.  This part considers 
whether the meaning of ‘conflict’ within the context of section 146 includes a situation 
of duplication between national and provincial legislation.  Before the discussion on 
section 146, some background to the proposed provincial legislation is set out below. 
(1) Background to the proposed provincial legislation  
(a) Concerns with the current approach to environmental regulation  
A primary problem of the current approach contained in the ECA and perpetuated in 
NEMA is the lack of integration in environmental regulation.  Under the current 
legislative regime, there may be up to three application and decision-making processes 
(followed by three separate appeal processes).  One of these is the authorisation for 
activities listed under the ECA, which is soon to be replaced with authorisations issued 
under section 24 of the NEMA.  The other processes facilitate approvals for one or more 
land use rights and approvals for activities that impact on heritage resources.156  The 
existing regulatory framework is set out in various general and sectoral pieces of 
national legislation, including the ECA, NEMA, the National Heritage Resources Act157 
                                                 
155 Section 41 of NEMA makes reference to assignments made in terms of section 99 of the Constitution. 
156 In particular, section 38 of the NHRA.  These include projects that do not require an environmental 
impact assessment or ‘EIA’ (in which case a comment from the decision-maker is required) or projects 
that require approval in terms of other sections of the NHRA, such as section 34. 




(‘NHRA’) and the Development Facilitation Act;158 as well as various provincial 
planning laws.159  All three spheres of government and different sectoral institutions are 
involved in the implementation of this legislation.   
On a conceptual level, the lack of integration seems inappropriate.  Since all the 
legislation is dealing with something that is inherently integrated,160 it makes little sense 
to regulate individual components separately.  In practice, the lack of integration means 
that decision-making processes overlap, which can result in duplication and in 
inconsistencies in decision-making.  For example, the conditions attached to decisions 
by the respective decision-makers may be contradictory or otherwise inconsistent with 
one another.  From the perspective of the general public, the different approval processes 
are confusing and many civil society organisations find that they cannot cope with the 
number of processes in which they are requested to participate.   
A further problem is that the planning laws pre-date the Constitution and have not been 
updated so as to ensure that plans for land use incorporate constitutional principles such 
as the need for sustainable development and the protection of the environment for 
present and future generations.161  While NEMA requires development to be sustainable, 
it does not provide sufficient guidance on what is meant by this term.162  Furthermore, 
NEMA approaches the identification of activities for which authorisation is required on 
a list basis.  The list is to be contained in the regulations made under section 24 of 
NEMA by the Minister.  It specifies thresholds (such as project size and capacity) below 
which authorisation is not required.  While having a list of specified activities for which 
authorisation is required promotes certainty, it allows activities not identified to slip 
through the regulatory cracks.  For example, new technologies such as nanotechnology 
that are unknown at the time when regulations are made would be excluded from the list 
despite their potential environmental impacts.  The use of a list also means that activities 
falling below the thresholds but taking place in a very sensitive area would not be 
regulated. 
 
                                                 
158 Act 67 of 1995. 
159 The Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (‘LUPO’) is the provincial planning law applicable in 
the Western Cape. 
160 The different aspects of the environment regulated under the applicable legislation function as a whole. 
161 Section 24 of the Constitution entrenches the right to environmental protection for both present and 
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assessment’.  However, NEMA provides no criteria that can assist decision-makers in determining when a 




(b) The objectives of the proposed provincial legislation 
In light of the problems with the current regulatory system, the Province has initiated a 
law reform process, relying on its concurrent legislative competency for environmental 
matters.163   
A key objective of the law reform is to integrate the decision-making processes related 
to land use, the environment and heritage resources.  Among other things,164 the 
proposed provincial legislation would provide for a single process that covers the 
application, investigation, decision-making and appeals stages of a proposal.  In terms of 
that process, anyone who wishes to undertake a project affecting land or involving a 
change in the way land is used and which is caught by the legislation would be required 
to conduct an assessment process in order to obtain a land use permit.   The application 
would be allocated to one of three levels of assessment, depending on the type of 
proposal and its location.  Public participation would be required, with all aspects of the 
application being covered within a single consultation process.  There would be a single 
decision-making process that provides for joint decision-making, where more than one 
decision-maker is involved in an application.  There would also be an appeal to the MEC 
(or the Municipal Council in certain circumstances) with an independent body of 
appropriate specialists providing recommendations on the merits of the appeal. 
In circumstances where there is a lack of integration between different decision-making 
processes, a potential solution is for the decision-makers empowered in terms of the 
different legislation to agree on an integrated approach.  The decision-making powers 
would be delegated to one designated organ of state and, where this was not possible, 
consultative processes would be agreed upon at the outset in relation to each 
development application received.  If this could be achieved in a workable manner,165 it 
would obviate the need for the proposed provincial law.  However, there are other 
important objectives of the integrated legislation that cannot be achieved in this way.  
For example, the integration of land use, environmental and heritage legislation cannot 
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contained in this dissertation, are taken from a Discussion Document dated July 2005, that was prepared 
by the drafting team and circulated to various stakeholders in preparation for consultation on the law 
reform process. 
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individual applications for authorisation against strategic plans. 
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Affairs (Western Cape), Municipality of Stellenbosch and Paradyskloof Golf Estate (Pty) Ltd (unreported) 




be undertaken in isolation of broader strategies and policies for environmental protection 
and development, including constitutional imperatives.   
Thus, an objective of the provincial law reform process is to ensure that the integrated 
legislation fulfils constitutional imperatives and that the criteria and principles 
underlying decisions taken in each of the three sectors are defensible.166  The 
Constitution refers in section 24 to the duty of the state to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures that, among other matters, ‘secure ecologically sustainable development 
and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development’.  The concept of ‘sustainable development’ or ‘ecologically sustainable 
development’ is multi-faceted.  In order to determine whether or not a proposed activity 
will contribute to, or detract from, the achievement of this long-term objective, it is 
necessary for decision-makers to consider a wide range of factors.  These include the 
potential impacts of a proposal on the health and well being of people, on cultural 
heritage and on the environment as a whole.  In order to capture these considerations 
within a single concept, the test of the ‘wise use’ of land would be used in the proposed 
provincial law.167  In this way, the provincial law would give substance to concepts such 
as sustainable development.   
Another objective of the proposed provincial legislation is to ensure that integrated 
planning in relation to land use, the environment and heritage resources is undertaken at 
both the provincial and municipal level.  While some integrated planning processes are 
in place, it is envisaged that the proposed new law would set out the minimum 
requirements for integrated planning, in order to ensure that plans are developed in a 
way that gives effect to sustainable development.  In practical terms, the provincial law 
would stipulate content requirements derived from sustainable development principles 
for municipal Integrated Development Plans and Spatial Development Frameworks as 
well as the Provincial Growth and Development Strategy and the Provincial Spatial 
Development Framework.   
A further objective of the proposed provincial legislation is to ensure that all activities 
that may impact detrimentally on the environment are captured within the regulatory 
framework.  Instead of the list system proposed by NEMA, the provincial law would 
establish authorisation triggers that cover land use, heritage resources and environment.  
In developing the triggers, account would be taken of the characteristics of the location 
of the proposed development and the receiving environment, in order to exclude 
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applications that are of no material importance.  Reference to the characteristics of the 
location of a proposal is considered to be more effective than the use of thresholds in 
determining whether authorisation is required or not.   
(c) Duplication between NEMA and the proposed provincial legislation 
In order for the proposed provincial legislation to be implemented effectively, it would 
be necessary for the Minister to exempt the Province from implementing and complying 
with the regulations made under section 24 of NEMA, except insofar as certain activities 
that will have national implications are concerned.168  If this does not happen, it will 
give rise to many instances of duplication.  Activities that are identified in the national 
list made under NEMA and captured by the triggers contained in the provincial 
legislation would be subject to double regulation.  In practice, proponents undertaking 
those activities in the Province would have to apply for authorisation under the national 
and the provincial legislation.  If the Province is identified as the competent authority by 
the Minister in terms of the regulations made under section 24 of NEMA, the Province 
would be responsible for administering both regulatory systems.   
Complying with the national legislation would not cause a proponent to be in breach of 
the provincial legislation and the converse applies equally.  The proponent would be 
entitled to proceed with the relevant activity once authorisation had been granted under 
both laws.  However, this form of duplication would squander resources and 
administrative capacity for those complying with, as well as those administering, the 
dual systems.  Inevitably, there would be resistance from the private sector to the 
double-layered regulation of new developments and it is likely that economic growth in 
the Province would be undermined.  It is therefore undesirable to have a situation in 
which both NEMA and the proposed provincial legislation are operative simultaneously 
in the Province.   
The problem of duplicated regulatory systems raises several constitutional issues.  The 
first is the extent to which the problem could be avoided by the application of the co-
operative governance principles; in particular, the requirement for spheres of 
government to co-ordinate the implementation of legislation.  This is discussed in part V 
below.  In the event that the duplication cannot be averted by means of co-operative 
governance principles, the second issue is whether the Constitution provides any 
mechanism for resolving the problem.  In this regard, section 146 of the Constitution 
addresses conflicts between national and provincial legislation and provides criteria that 
guide the court in determining which legislation should prevail.  The references to 
national and provincial legislation include subordinate legislation made under an Act of 
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Parliament or a provincial Act respectively.169  Accordingly, section 146 would also 
apply to a conflict between the provincial legislation and the regulations made by the 
Minister under section 24 of NEMA.  Because the application of the section presupposes 
the existence of a conflict, it is necessary to consider what constitutes a conflict within 
the context of section 146.  Does a conflict include duplication between two regulatory 
systems in circumstances where compliance with one of the systems does not place a 
person in contravention of the other system?   
(2) The meaning of ‘conflict’ in section 146 
There are two obstacles to the application of section 146 of the Constitution.  The first of 
these is section 45 of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (‘IGR Act’).170  
This section prohibits a sphere of government or organ of state from instituting judicial 
proceedings to settle an intergovernmental dispute unless the dispute has first been 
declared a formal intergovernmental dispute in terms of section 41 of the IGR Act and 
all efforts to settle it in terms of Chapter 4 of that Act have failed.171  Does ‘instituting 
judicial proceedings’ include approaching a court in terms of section 146 of the 
Constitution?  The Constitution does not indicate how a matter is to be brought before 
the court for resolution in terms of section 146.  Presumably, any party may apply to a 
court once both sets of legislation have been passed for a declaratory order that 
determines which legislation prevails in terms of section 146.172  In the absence of such 
an application, there is no mechanism that triggers a determination by a court in terms of 
section 146.173  Thus, there seems to be no ground on which to distinguish between 
‘instituting judicial proceedings’ within the meaning of section 45 of the IGR Act and 
approaching a court to resolve a dispute in terms of section 146 of the Constitution.  It 
follows that the requirements of section 45 of the IGR Act must be met before either 
party to a dispute may approach the court in terms of section 146 of the Constitution.  
This represents a limitation on the right of access to the courts contained in section 34 of 
the Constitution; however, the IGR Act falls under section 41 of the Constitution, which 
contemplates a limitation on this right in the context of intergovernmental disputes.174
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Constitution. 
170 Act 13 of 2005. 
171 Section 45(1) of the IGR Act.   
172 An application could be brought by the organs of state involved in the matter or by private parties with 
an interest in having the problem of duplication resolved. 
173 Presumably, in light of the requirements in section 41 of the Constitution for the co-ordination of 
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that a situation of conflicting legislation does not persist indefinitely.  However, a thorough consideration 
of whether the parties would have a duty to approach the court in the context of a section 146 conflict is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.   




Section 146 provides the second obstacle to its own application – the section only 
applies when there is a conflict between national and provincial legislation.  Thus, in 
circumstances where there is no conflict section 146 does not apply.  What is meant by 
‘conflict’?  The Constitution does not define the term.  Section 150 of the Constitution 
provides that ‘when considering an apparent conflict between national and provincial 
legislation’ a court must prefer ‘any reasonable interpretation of the legislation … that 
avoids a conflict, over any alternative interpretation that results in a conflict’.  However, 
this does not shed any light on what is meant by the term ‘conflict’.  It simply asks the 
courts to find ways of interpreting legislation so as to avoid identifying a conflict.  This 
is not helpful in the context of the duplication presented by the simultaneous application 
of NEMA and the proposed provincial legislation.  For example, it is likely that both 
laws would require a person wishing to develop a residential housing estate alongside an 
estuary to apply for authorisation.  Under NEMA, the application would be made to the 
competent authority and under the proposed provincial legislation it would be made to 
the integrated decision-making body established for this purpose.  Assuming that the 
ordinary meaning of the legislation is clear, the court has no leeway to interpret it in any 
other way.  Thus, the developer is faced with the obligation of making duplicated 
applications and resources are wasted by the two spheres of government in the 
implementation of parallel regulatory systems.  The critical question is whether this 
situation amounts to a conflict that triggers the application of section 146, thereby 
allowing the court to determine which regulatory system should prevail. 
The ordinary meaning of ‘conflict’ as a noun is ‘an incompatibility between opinions, 
principles and so forth’; when used in its adjective form ‘conflicting’ refers to an 
incompatibility, variance or clash.175  Currie and De Waal suggest that a conflict in the 
context of section 146 refers to an inconsistency between laws.176  The authors explain 
this to mean that an inconsistency exists where the laws cannot be obeyed at the same 
time.177  In other words, provisions of two laws will not be inconsistent where it is 
possible to obey each without disobeying the other.178  In support of this, they refer to 
the construction of conflict adopted by the Constitutional Court in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Certification matter.179  The difficulty with this approach is that it means that unless a 
law contradicts another, there is no conflict.  In other words, the Constitution allows the 
two laws to exist side-by-side.  In the context of the proposed provincial law, this places 
a huge burden on the Province, as it must implement the regulatory system under section 
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24 of NEMA as well as the proposed provincial law, if the latter is passed.  Clearly this 
discourages any provincial initiative in legislating on subject matter within a functional 
area that has already been legislated on by the national government.  Should a province 
do so, it is faced with the task of having to implement two parallel systems.  If this were 
the effect that the Constitution intended to achieve, it would have made far more sense 
to adopt the approach taken in the German Basic Law.  In terms of the Basic Law, the 
Lander may legislate on matters for which they share concurrent competency with the 
federation only as long as, and to the extent that, the federation does not exercise its 
powers to legislate.180  Accordingly, it is necessary to cast the net wider in seeking to 
interpret the term ‘conflict’ in a manner that accords with the South African 
constitutional framework. 
De Ville has explored the meaning of legislative inconsistency in the context of the 
Interim Constitution.181  The Interim Constitution does not require conflict to be 
established as a precondition to the application of its provisions for determining the 
paramountcy of provincial and national laws that regulate the same subject matter.182  
However, it states that an Act of Parliament and a provincial law ‘shall be construed as 
being consistent with each other, unless and only to the extent that, they are, expressly or 
by necessary implication, inconsistent with each other.183  De Ville explains that express 
inconsistency exists where it is impossible for a person to comply with both the 
provisions of an Act of Parliament and a provincial Act.184  Inconsistency by necessary 
implication is interpreted more widely: in the author’s view, it exists where the purpose 
of the parliamentary or provincial Act is to regulate the subject matter exhaustively.185  
This would be a question of interpreting the relevant Act.  These explanations of 
consistency do not resolve the issue that arises in the context of duplicating laws, except 
in circumstances where only one of the laws is intended to regulate the subject matter 
exhaustively.  In other words, it cannot assist where, on a proper construction, both laws 
intend to regulate the subject matter exhaustively.   
There is an alternative and wider interpretation of inconsistency or conflict within the 
context of section 146 that is more in keeping with the broader constitutional framework 
than the explanations discussed above.  The golden rule of interpreting statutes has been 
formulated as follows: 
‘We are to take a whole statute together and construe it altogether, giving the words their ordinary 
signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency… so as to justify the Court in 
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placing on them some other signification, which though less proper is one which the Court thinks 
the words will bear.’186
This places the greatest emphasis on the ordinary meaning, read within the context of the 
relevant statute as a whole.  Building on that, the intention of the legislature is also 
recognised as an important factor.  Thus, the test for interpretation of statutes is that the 
intention of the legislature must be determined with reference to the ordinary 
grammatical meaning of the words used, unless that would lead to an inconsistency or an 
absurdity, in which case the ordinary meaning may be modified.187  An inconsistency or 
absurdity should be determined primarily with reference to the context of the statute as a 
whole.  Applying these principles to the interpretation of ‘conflict’ in section 146, there 
are several important observations.  First, the Constitution reflects a model of co-
operative federalism as opposed to competitive federalism.  For this reason, it confers 
broad areas of concurrency on the national and provincial governments.  However, 
unlike the German constitutional system on which it is primarily modelled, the 
Constitution does not preclude provinces from legislating in those concurrent areas once 
the national government has done so.  The converse applies equally: the national 
government may legislate in concurrent areas where a provincial legislature has already 
done so.  In order for this to work successfully, considerable efforts at co-operation are 
required.  For this reason, the Constitution specifically requires different spheres of 
government to co-ordinate their legislation and the Constitutional Court has underscored 
the importance of a co-operative approach when it comes to the making and 
implementation of legislation.188   
Second, section 146 only becomes applicable when co-operative governance fails.  In 
fact, in terms of section 45 of the IGR Act, the parties to a dispute are precluded from 
approaching a court in terms of section 146 unless they have exhausted all other options 
provided for in the IGR Act and Chapter 3 of the Constitution.  Therefore, the provision 
dealing with ‘conflict’ is the last resort and should be given a wide enough reading to 
resolve all disputes that relate to a failure to co-ordinate legislation in a workable 
manner.  This leads on to the third observation.  The purpose of the constitutional 
framework is to establish a government that can serve the interests of its electorate.  
Having duplicated, parallel regulatory systems increases the resources needed for 
administration purposes.  It is not in the public interest to have financial and other 
resources squandered in this manner.  Moreover, duplicated systems may inhibit 
economic development, particularly where the systems provide for regulatory approvals, 
increasing the obligations of those wishing to undertake activities for which 
authorisation is required.   
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If section 146 does not apply in these circumstances, the likelihood is that both national 
and provincial governments will be reluctant to innovate or seek to improve on existing 
regulatory systems in areas of concurrent legislative competency.   This could not have 
been the intention behind the Constitution, in giving concurrent powers to the national 
and provincial government without an automatic national override, such as that which 
applies in the German system.  Again, this would also not serve the interests of the 
electorate.  Ultimately, the best laws should be in place and section 146 provides a 
mechanism for determining this.  Thus, it is suggested that ‘conflict’ should be 
interpreted generously so as to include duplication between two regulatory systems.  In 
this context, the ‘inconsistency’ or ‘conflict’ between the two systems would be 
interpreted to refer to the fact that it is not the intention of the Constitution to authorise 
and facilitate the implementation of duplicated regulatory systems.189   
(3) A brief discussion of certain aspects of section 146 
Two assumptions must be made for the purposes of discussing section 146.  The first is 
that the proposed provincial law and the regulations under NEMA have both become 
operative, as this triggers the application of section 146.  The second is that these laws 
are in conflict with one another within the meaning of ‘conflict’ in section 146.  On the 
strength of these assumptions, the provisions of section 146 become relevant. 
Section 146 provides for national legislation to prevail over provincial legislation in two 
broad sets of circumstances.  In all other circumstances, provincial legislation 
prevails.190  The burden of proof rests on the party seeking to assert that the national 
legislation should prevail.191  Once it has been determined which legislation should 
prevail, the other legislation is rendered inoperative to the extent of the conflict between 
the two.192   
The first set of circumstances is where the national legislation applies uniformly to the 
country as a whole and the national legislation meets one or more specified conditions, 
which include the following:193   
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1. ‘the national legislation deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by 
legislation enacted by the respective provinces individually’;194 
2. the matter regulated by the national legislation requires uniformity for effective 
regulation and ‘the national legislation provides that uniformity by establishing 
norms and standards; frameworks or national policies’;195 
3. the national legislation is necessary for one or more objectives that include ‘the 
protection of the environment’.196 
The second set of circumstances in which national legislation prevails is where it is 
‘aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a province that is prejudicial to the 
economic, health or security interests of another province or the country’ or that 
‘impedes the implementation of national economic policy’.197   
Where a court cannot resolve a dispute concerning a conflict, the national legislation 
prevails over the provincial legislation.198   
The application of section 146 involves a two-stage enquiry.199  The first stage is to 
examine the national and provincial legislation individually in order to determine 
whether they are both competent: in other words, does the legislation fall within the 
constitutional competency of the respective legislatures?200  The second stage is to 
determine how section 146 applies to resolve the particular conflict.  As noted above, a 
pre-condition for this two-stage enquiry is that there is in fact a conflict between the 
national and provincial legislation.  Both stages require a consideration of the specific 
provisions of the legislation in question.  An assessment of the regulations made under 
NEMA and the proposed provincial legislation with reference to the provisions of 
section 146 is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  However, I would like to comment 
on one aspect of section 146 in the context of the regulations and the proposed 
provincial legislation.   
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In terms of section 146, the first set of circumstances in which the regulations would 
prevail is if they apply uniformly to the country as a whole and meet one or more of the 
further conditions specified in section 146 (and outlined above).  Section 24 of NEMA 
does apply uniformly to the country as a whole, as will the regulations made under 
section 24 once they come into effect.  Therefore I have assumed for the purposes of this 
discussion that the regulations currently do apply uniformly to the country as a whole.   
One of the further conditions that, if met, will cause the regulations to prevail, is where 
the regulations are necessary for the protection of the environment.  A key question is 
whether the necessity of the national legislation must be gauged with reference to the 
provisions of the provincial legislation.  In other words, it may be sufficient to consider 
whether the national legislation (taken in isolation) is necessary for the protection of the 
environment.  If it meets the test, then it would prevail (subject to meeting the 
uniformity requirement).  The alternative interpretation of this condition is that the 
national legislation must be considered with reference to the provisions of the provincial 
legislation.  The latter interpretation is not supported expressly by the text of section 
146.201  However, it is not excluded by the constitutional text.  Furthermore, applying 
the first interpretation in relation to legislation falling within the functional area of the 
environment would lead to an absurdity.  If the national legislation is considered in 
isolation, it will always result in a conclusion that it is necessary for the protection of the 
environment, unless the national legislation is so inappropriately framed that it actually 
undermines environmental protection.  This could not have been the intention of the 
legislature, as it negates the conferral of concurrent powers on the provinces in relation 
to the functional area of the environment.  Thus, the latter interpretation should be 
adopted, as it is more consistent with the constitutional framework.  On this 
interpretation, the necessity of the national legislation for environmental protection must 
be assessed with reference to the necessity of the provincial legislation for that same 
purpose.  This can only be done on a section-by-section comparison of the two sets of 
legislation, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
V. CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NEMA 
The joint allocation of power to the national government and the provinces for the 
implementation of NEMA is a consequence of the co-operative federal system 
established by the Constitution.  The principles of co-operative governance apply to all 
three spheres of government, which are obliged to observe and adhere to the principles 
and conduct their activities within the parameters of the Chapter.202  Specifically, the 
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principles bind all organs of state within each sphere: this includes the national Cabinet 
members and the members of the provincial Executive Councils.203   
Thus, the principles of co-operative governance are relevant to the implementation of 
legislation.  This includes the decision by the Minister to assign the responsibility for the 
implementation of NEMA to the provinces.  Furthermore, co-operative governance 
principles apply in the context of seeking to avoid a situation where there is duplication 
between the regulatory systems provided for in section 24 of NEMA and the proposed 
provincial legislation.   
For present purposes, the following principles set out in Chapter 3 are worth 
highlighting: 
‘41 (1) All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must – 
(a) to (d) ….. 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other 
spheres; 
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; 
(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; 
(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by – 
(i) to (ii) …. 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common 
interest;  
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) …. 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
(2) …. 
(3) An organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable effort 
to settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, and must 
exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute. 
(4) If a court is not satisfied that the requirements of subsection (3) have been met, it may refer a 
dispute back to the organs of state involved.’ 
It is helpful to consider the manner in which the Constitutional Court has interpreted 
Chapter 3.  Section 40 states that the spheres of government are distinctive yet 
interdependent and interrelated.  This was elaborated on in the Premier, Western Cape 
case as follows: 
‘The principle of co-operative government is established in s 40 where all spheres of government 
are described as being “distinctive, inter-dependent and inter-related”.  This is consistent with the 
way powers have been allocated between different spheres of government.  Distinctiveness lies in 
the provision made for elected governments at national, provincial and local levels.  The 
interdependence and interrelatedness flow from the founding provision that South Africa is “one 
sovereign, democratic state”, and a constitutional structure which makes provision for framework 
provisions to be set by the national sphere of government.  These provisions vest concurrent 
legislative competencies in respect of important matters in the national and provincial spheres of 
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government, and contemplate that provincial executives will have responsibility for implementing 
certain national laws as well as provincial laws.’204
In the Langeberg Municipality case205 the Constitutional Court noted, also in the context 
of section 40, that the interrelatedness and interdependence of the different spheres 
requires them to ‘ensure that, while they do not tread on each other’s toes, they 
understand that all of them perform governmental functions for the benefit of the people 
of the country as a whole’.206   
Co-operation is particularly important in relation to powers and responsibilities that are 
allocated concurrently to different spheres of government.  In the Premier, Western 
Cape case, the Constitutional Court noted that Chapter 3 is designed to ensure that the 
different spheres of government co-operate with each other ‘to secure the 
implementation of legislation in which they all have a common interest’.207  The Court 
went on to explain why this is particularly important in areas of concurrent competency: 
‘Co-operation is of particular importance in the field of concurrent law-making and implementation 
of laws.  It is desirable where possible to avoid conflicting legislative provisions, to determine the 
administrations which will implement laws that are made, and to ensure that adequate provision is 
made therefor in the budgets of the different governments.’208   
The observation made by the Court in the Premier, Western Cape case underscores 
section 41(1)(h)(iv), which mandates organs of state to co-ordinate their actions and 
legislation. 
In the Education Policy Bill case,209 the Constitutional Court noted that consultation and 
co-operation appears to be essential in circumstances where both Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures have exercised or wish to exercise concurrent competencies:  
‘It is necessary to enable the national government to obtain the information it may require to enable 
it to take decisions in regard to educational matters falling within the ambit of ss 126(3)(a)-(e) of 
the Constitution; it is necessary to avoid conflicting legislative provisions and to rationalise the 
legislation applicable to Schedule 6 matters; and it is necessary to enable provincial and national 
governments to formulate their plans, including budgetary allocations, for the future.  The setting 
up of parallel national administration in a province to procure the information that the national 
government needs, and to implement legislation enacted pursuant thereto, would be neither cost-
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effective nor efficient, and moreover, would be likely to be more intrusive of provincial structures 
than legislation which calls for co-operation.’210
Therefore it is quite clear that co-operation and consultation are fundamental 
requirements of co-operative government and that these requirements apply to the 
making and implementation of legislation in areas of concurrent competency shared 
between different spheres of government.  Woolman et al extract two basic principles 
that underlie co-operative government.211  First, a sphere of government or organ of 
state must not use its powers in a way that undermines the effective functioning of 
another sphere or organ of state.212  Second, the integrity of each sphere of government 
and organ of state (referred to in section 41(1)(g)) must be understood in light of the 
powers and purpose of that entity.213  These principles are applicable equally in the 
context of a divided federal model.  However, in light of the Langeberg Municipality 
case,214 I would add that the different spheres and organs of state must be guided 
constantly by the obligation to exercise their powers collectively for the benefit of the 
country as a whole.  This requires a high degree of co-operation: all the parties involved 
in a matter must be open to alternative view points and willing to reconsider their 
position in the course of consultation that is undertaken in good faith.  As was stated in 
the Gambling Board case,215 each party to an intergovernmental dispute has an 
obligation to re-evaluate its position fundamentally.216
The application of this co-operative approach is relatively straightforward in 
circumstances where the parties to a dispute are able to identify common ground.  What 
happens in the opposite scenario where neither party is prepared to compromise its 
position after extensive rounds of consultation and negotiation?  Taking the example of 
section 24 of NEMA, it is evident that there are diverging views on its implementation.  
The Minister sees the provincial executives as the appropriate organs of state to 
implement the regulatory system of environmental authorisations provided for in section 
24.  The Province regards the regulatory system as problematic and wants to replace it 
with an alternative provincial law.  On this basis, the Province would be likely to 
withhold its agreement to being identified as a competent authority under NEMA, 
particularly once the proposed provincial legislation has been passed.  In these 
circumstances, more concrete principles than the obligation to consult and co-operate are 
needed to break the deadlock.  
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Chapter 3 of the Constitution requires that appropriate mechanisms and procedures to 
facilitate settlement of intergovernmental disputes must be provided for in an Act of 
Parliament.217  The Act intended to fulfil that obligation is the IGR Act, referred to in 
part III of this dissertation.  Chapter 4 of the IGR Act outlines a procedure for declaring 
a dispute and engaging in negotiations, facilitated by a neutral third party, if necessary.  
However, the key shortcoming of Chapter 4 is that it does not actually provide 
mechanisms that can be used to break a deadlock, once the process of consultation and 
negotiation has failed to reconcile divergent views.  This is particularly problematic in 
the context of concurrent powers, as more than one organ of state has the responsibility 
and power to determine the manner in which it should be exercised.   
A mechanism of potential value for breaking a deadlock is to identify the organ of state 
or sphere of government that is ultimately responsible for the performance of a particular 
function or the exercise of a particular power.  The Grootboom case218 provides a useful 
example in this regard.  The facts made reference to the establishment and 
implementation of a co-ordinated state housing program.  The right of access to 
adequate housing is entrenched in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, which contains the Bill 
of Rights.219  In the Grootboom matter, the Constitutional Court made the following 
statement: 
‘[A] co-ordinated State housing program must be a comprehensive one determined by all three 
spheres of government in consultation with each other as contemplated by chap 3 of the 
Constitution… Each sphere of government must accept responsibility for the implementation of 
particular parts of the program but the national sphere of government must assume responsibility 
for ensuring that laws, policies, programs and strategies are adequate to meet the State’s s 26 
obligations.’220
This emphasises the fact that the responsibility to ensure that legislation meets the 
obligations imposed by the Bill of Rights falls on the national government.  This 
responsibility goes hand in hand with the responsibility of national government to make 
framework legislation that sets norms and standards.221  Thus, while the Constitution 
avoids giving the national government the upper hand when engaging with provinces in 
the consultative and co-operative approach mandated by Chapter 3,222 the constitutional 
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framework envisages the national government playing the leading role when it comes to 
ensuring that legislation is in place to give effect to the rights in the Bill of Rights.  The 
national government is also mandated with establishing framework legislation or 
legislation that applies uniformly for the purposes of setting norms and standards or 
maintaining standards.223  This role applies primarily when making legislation but it is 
also relevant in the context of implementing legislation, as this is the stage at which 
legislation is given its intended effect.   
An analogy can be drawn between the Grootboom matter224 and the implementation of 
section 24 of NEMA.  Like the functional area of housing, ‘environment’ is a functional 
area of concurrent competency between the national and provincial governments in 
terms of Schedule 4 of the Constitution.  Furthermore, the right to an environment not 
harmful to ‘health or well-being’ and the protection of the environment ‘for the benefit 
of present and future generations’ is entrenched in Chapter 2.225  This mirrors the 
constitutional protection of the right to adequate housing.  On this basis, it can be argued 
that the national government bears the primary responsibility for ensuring that NEMA is 
implemented.226  This responsibility extends to ensuring that the implementation occurs 
in a manner that fulfils or is likely to fulfil the environmental right in the Bill of Rights.  
In the process of meeting this responsibility, there is no doubt that the Minister is 
required to consult the Province (and the other provinces) and co-ordinate the actions of 
the national executive with proposed actions by the provinces that are also directed at 
the implementation of the legislation in question.  This follows from the principles set 
out in Chapter 3.227  However, after a process of consultation, the national executive 
may form a view that the proposed provincial legislation will not meet the 
environmental objectives underpinning section 24 of NEMA.  For example, there may 
be concerns about the uncertainty associated with the provincial system of triggers for 
determining when an authorisation is required.228  Unscrupulous persons could use those 
uncertainties in order to avoid making applications for authorisation in circumstances 
where there is doubt as to whether an application is required.   
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Following the analogy in the Grootboom case229 to its logical conclusion, it could be 
argued that the Minister could override the Province and identify it as the competent 
authority, despite the refusal of the Province to consent to this allocation of 
responsibility.  The only proviso would be that the Province has the administrative 
capacity and the financial resources to administer section 24 and the regulations.  There 
are several problems with this argument.  Firstly, it does not conform in any way to the 
requirement of agreement to an assignment in terms of section 99 of the Constitution.  
Secondly, it effectively allows the Minister to treat the provinces as national agencies, 
which is not what the Constitution contemplates.  Furthermore, this approach does not 
necessarily give rise to the best outcome from an objective perspective.  The Minister is 
not an independent or impartial third party and may choose NEMA over the provincial 
legislation on political grounds rather than on the basis that NEMA gives effect to the 
environmental right most effectively. 
What are the possible alternative mechanisms for breaking a deadlock between the 
Minister and the Province?  Would it be acceptable for the Minister and the Province to 
appoint an independent expert to evaluate the merits of the regulatory system 
encapsulated in section 24 of NEMA against the regulatory system envisaged in the 
proposed provincial legislation?  As part of the evaluation, both parties could prepare a 
written motivation for persisting with their viewpoints, after having re-evaluated their 
respective positions as exhorted by the Gambling Board case.230  Drawing on the views 
expressed in the Langeberg Municipality case,231 the purpose of the evaluation would be 
to determine the regulatory system that best serves the interests of the Province (without 
detracting from the interests of the country as a whole).   
Arguably, additional factors relevant to the evaluation would include those set out in 
section 146 of the Constitution.  These factors determine the circumstances in which 
national legislation should prevail over provincial legislation.  Although it is 
contemplated that a court in resolving a conflict between national and provincial 
legislation would ordinarily apply these factors,232 there is no reason why the factors 
could not be applied by the parties to a dispute, prior to the matter having been referred 
to a court for resolution.  In fact, it seems prudent for the parties to bear them in mind, 
knowing that ultimately these are the factors that a court would apply.   
The findings of the evaluation would determine what constitutes reasonable behaviour 
on the part of the parties to the dispute.  The written motivations could then be reviewed 
by independent experts and weighed against one another.  Reasonableness is an 
important factor in Chapter 3 of the Constitution.233  If the proposed provincial 
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legislation were regarded as a more effective form of environmental management than 
section 24 of NEMA, reasonableness would dictate that the Minister should be willing to 
suspend the operation of section 24 in the Province.  Equally, if NEMA were regarded as 
a more effective regulatory system and solutions could be found to the concerns 
identified by the Province in relation to its implementation, it would be unreasonable for 
the Province to withhold its agreement to an assignment of the responsibility for 
implementing NEMA.   
In these circumstances, the requirement for agreement in terms of section 99 of the 
Constitution does not equate to the voluntary consent contemplated in the private law 
realm of contract.  Rather, it refers to the conclusion of an arrangement, in terms of a 
good faith consultative process that culminates (if necessary) in the intervention by an 
independent third party that is appointed to determine how the matter should be 
resolved.  While this may seem to be stretching interpretations of ‘agreement’ in the 
context of section 99 too far, it is worth noting that, in the context of assignment by 
provincial executives to local government, it has been suggested that deadlocks should 
be referred to the Minister of Provincial and Local Government.234   The Minister then 
takes a decision on whether the assignment should proceed.235  
VI. CONCLUSION  
An assessment of aspects of NEMA and the proposed provincial legislation raises 
several interesting issues.  It is evident from section 24 of NEMA, read with sections 85 
and 125 of the Constitution, that both the national executive and the provincial 
executives have a responsibility to implement section 24.  However, the powers of the 
provincial executives are curtailed by the requirement to act with the concurrence of the 
Minister.  While this suggests that the national executive is given the leading role in 
implementing NEMA, it does not constitute a blank cheque.  In particular, it is trite that 
any attempt to allocate full responsibility for implementation to the provinces must be 
consistent with the Constitution, particularly in circumstances where NEMA does not 
contemplate such allocation expressly.   
As noted in part III, the Constitution contemplates three forms of allocating 
responsibility.  Agency arrangements and delegation are more suited to a relationship of 
subordination, as the principal or delegans (as the case may be) retains responsibility for, 
and a varying degree of control over, the exercise of the allocated power or function. 
Thus, these arrangements do not apply readily in the context of NEMA and, more 
                                                 
234 Ashira Consulting/Palmer Development Group ‘Framework for the assignment of powers and 
functions: Discussion Document: Towards the Development of a Policy Framework for the Assignment of 
Powers and Functions to Local Government’ (December 2002) Commissioned by the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government.  See para 93 on page 32.  Assignment to a Municipal Council is 
provided for in section 126 of the Constitution.  As in the case of section 99, there is a requirement for 





broadly, the constitutional relationship between the national and provincial spheres of 
government.  Furthermore, the requirements for an assignment are more suited to the 
transfer of powers and functions between different spheres because they take into 
account the administrative and financial implications of such transfers.  Consequently, 
the allocation to provinces of full responsibility for the implementation of NEMA fits 
most comfortably into the category of an assignment.   
Section 99 of the Constitution requires an assignment to the provincial executive to be 
done in terms of an agreement.  Agreement in this context is not necessarily 
synonymous with the voluntary consent envisaged in the private law realm.  It must be 
understood in light of the co-operative governance principles that apply to the 
implementation of legislation and, the obligation of all spheres of government to choose 
outcomes that further the interests of the country as a whole.  In that context, it is 
arguable that the provinces may not withhold their consent to an assignment that 
achieves the optimal outcome.  In other words, the requirement of agreement is not 
absolute and a province cannot withhold its agreement unreasonably.  For the purposes 
of determining an optimal outcome, a potential mechanism is to obtain an independent 
assessment of the various options by a third party.      
In terms of the case study, assuming a failure to resolve the matter co-operatively, the 
likely outcome is the simultaneous operation of section 24 of NEMA and the proposed 
provincial legislation in the Province.  This creates the potential for duplication in areas 
where the regulatory systems overlap.  The provisions of section 146 of the Constitution 
apply to conflicts between national and provincial legislation.  The question is whether 
the duplication between the regulatory systems amounts to a conflict within the meaning 
of section 46.  Relying on principles of interpretation intended to avoid an absurdity in 
outcome, it is arguable that conflict should include duplication between legislation.  The 
alternative is that such duplication stands, placing an onerous burden of implementation 
on the Province and requiring double hurdles of compliance for those wishing to 
undertake regulated activities in the Province.  This would discourage any further 
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